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Timbs v. Indiana
Ruling Below: State of Indiana v. Tyson Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2017)
Overview: Tyson Timbs tried selling drugs to undercover officers resulting in his arrest. As a
result of pleading guilty to his drug charge, in the State of Indiana Civil Court, Timbs was forced
to forfeit his Land Rover.
Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is incorporated against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
State of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
Tyson Timbs, Appellee (Defendant below)
Indiana Supreme Court
Decided on November 2, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
transport heroin. Timbs’s trafficking came to
the attention of a confidential police
informant, who told a member of the Joint
Effort Against Narcotics team that he could
buy heroin from Timbs. Police set up a
controlled buy, and the informant and an
undercover detective bought two grams of
heroin from Timbs for $225. Police made
another controlled buy a couple of weeks
later, acquiring another two grams of heroin
for $160. During the second buy, the
detective set up a third controlled buy with
Timbs. The day the third buy was to occur,
police apprehended Timbs during a traffic
stop. The Land Rover had 1,237 miles on its
odometer when Timbs bought it in January,
and more than 17,000 miles when police
seized the vehicle in late May.

SLAUGHTER, Justice:
The State sought to forfeit
Defendant’s Land Rover after he used it to
transport illegal drugs. The trial court held
the proposed forfeiture would violate the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause. We conclude the Excessive Fines
Clause does not bar the State from forfeiting
Defendant’s vehicle because the United
States Supreme Court has not held that the
Clause applies to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Factual and Procedural History
Defendant, Tyson Timbs, used lifeinsurance proceeds after his father’s death to
pay $42,058.30 for a Land Rover in January
2013. Over the next four months, Timbs
regularly drove the Land Rover between
Marion and Richmond, Indiana, to buy and

In June 2013, the State charged Timbs
with two counts of Class B felony dealing in
a controlled substance and one count of Class
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D felony conspiracy to commit theft. Nearly
two years later, in 2015, Timbs pleaded guilty
to one count of Class B felony dealing and
one count of Class D felony conspiracy to
commit theft in exchange for the State’s
dismissing the remaining charge. The trial
court accepted the plea and sentenced Timbs
to six years, with one year executed in
community corrections and five years
suspended to probation. Timbs also agreed to
pay police costs of $385, an interdiction fee
of $200, court costs of $168, a bond fee of
$50, and a $400 fee for undergoing a drugand-alcohol assessment with the probation
department.

Clause applies to forfeitures by the State.
Whether a Bill of Rights provision applies to
the States is a purely legal question. We
review such questions de novo. State v.
Harper, 8 N.E.3d 694, 696 (Ind. 2014).
Unlike legal questions, a trial court’s factual
determinations are reviewed for clear error.
Fischer v. Heymann, 12 N.E.3d 867, 870
(Ind. 2014). We will not reweigh evidence or
determine the credibility of witnesses, and we
will consider only the evidence favorable to
the judgment and the logical inferences
drawn from it. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); Hitch v.
State, 51 N.E.3d 216, 226 (Ind. 2016).
Discussion and Decision

Within a couple months of bringing
criminal charges, the State also sought to
forfeit the Land Rover. After a bench trial, the
court issued written findings that denied the
State’s action, concluding that forfeiture
would be an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment. “The amount of the forfeiture
sought is excessive and is grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the
Defendant’s offense.” The trial court
observed that the maximum statutory fine for
Timbs’s Class B felony was $10,000 on the
day he was arrested and noted the vehicle was
worth approximately four times this amount
when he bought it just a few months earlier.
The court made no finding about the
vehicle’s value on Timbs’s arrest date. Based
on its holding, the court ordered the State to
release the vehicle immediately. A divided
Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Timbs, 62
N.E.3d 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We granted
transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals’
opinion, and now reverse

I.

The United States Supreme Court
has never enforced the Excessive
Fines Clause against the States,
and we opt not to do so here.

The framers’ original conception was
settled long ago that the Bill of Rights applies
only to the national government and cannot
be enforced against the States. See Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
Only after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment did the Supreme Court, in the
early twentieth century, begin to apply
various provisions of the Bill of Rights to the
States through the doctrine of selective
incorporation. Justice Black’s argument for
total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, see,
e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 7172, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), has
never carried the day. McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761-63 (2010).

Standard of Review
To date, the Supreme Court has
incorporated most of the first eight
amendments—with
a
few
notable
exceptions: the Third Amendment’s
protection against quartering soldiers, the

Before addressing whether forfeiture
of Timbs’s Land Rover would be an
excessive fine, we must decide the antecedent
question of whether the Excessive Fines
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Fifth Amendment’s grand-jury requirement,
and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a civil
jury trial. Id. at 765 n.13 (citations omitted).
At issue here is whether the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is
enforceable against the States. We hold it is
not.

incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause was
merely dictum. “In noting that the due
process clause also incorporated the Eighth
Amendment prohibitions against excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishments, the
Court cited Furman v. Georgia, … which
involved an application of the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments.”
Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure
§ 2.6(b), n.45 at 833 (4th ed. 2015).

The Eighth Amendment provides:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has never
held that States are subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause. The Court initially declined to
decide the Clause’s incorporation status.

Despite Cooper’s 2001 dictum that
the Clause can be enforced against States, the
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement
on this subject, in 2010, suggests the Clause
has not been incorporated after all.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13. McDonald
was an incorporation case. At issue was
whether the Second Amendment’s individual
right to keep and bear arms, recognized in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008), is enforceable against the States.
McDonald held that it is—a position
commanding the support of five Justices, four
of whom agreed it was enforceable through
the Due Process Clause. Only Justice Thomas
believed the basis for decision should be the
Privileges
and
Immunities
Clause.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805-58 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment). En
route to deciding that the Second
Amendment applies to the States, McDonald
observed that “[o]nly a handful of the Bill of
Rights protections remain unincorporated”,
id. at 765, and included on that list “the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
excessive fines.” Id. at 765 n.13. Citing only
Browning-Ferris and not Cooper, the Court
stated, “We have never decided whether the
… Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
excessive fines applies to the States through
the Due Process Clause.” Id.

Because of the result we reach today,
we need not answer several questions
that otherwise might be necessarily
antecedent to finding the Eighth
Amendment’s
Excessive
Fines
Clause applicable to an award of
punitive damages, … [including]
whether the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive fines applies
to the several States through the
Fourteenth Amendment[.]
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22
(1989).
A dozen years later, in a case
involving not a fine but another punitivedamages award, the Supreme Court stated in
dictum that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause “makes the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishments
applicable to the States.” Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 433- 34 (2001) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)).
A prominent treatise on criminal procedure
observed
that
Cooper’s
statement

It is not self-evident why the
McDonald Court did not mention Cooper.
Perhaps the omission was an oversight,
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though we will not conclude lightly that the
Supreme Court whiffed on the existence or
meaning of its precedent. The more likely
explanation is that McDonald was treating
Cooper’s statement as superfluous to
Cooper’s holding and therefore dictum. Just
as Cooper’s statement that the Excessive
Fines Clause is enforceable against the States
is dictum, so too is McDonald’s statement
that the Clause is not.

Court decides the issue authoritatively. We
choose this latter, more cautious approach for
two reasons. First, although the Supreme
Court has addressed this issue only in dicta,
its statement in McDonald that the Clause has
not been incorporated is entitled to more
weight because it is the Court’s most recent.
Second, Indiana is a sovereign state within
our federal system, and we elect not to
impose federal obligations on the State that
the federal government itself has not
mandated. An important corollary is that
Indiana has its own system of legal, including
constitutional, protections for its citizens and
other persons within its jurisdiction. Absent a
definitive holding from the Supreme Court,
we decline to subject Indiana to a federal test
that may operate to impede development of
our own excessive-fines jurisprudence under
the Indiana Constitution

So where does that leave us? Given
the lack of clear direction from the Supreme
Court, we have a couple of options. One
option is to ignore McDonald and follow the
lead of some courts that have either applied
the Excessive Fines Clause to challenged
state action or assumed without deciding that
the Clause applies. See, e.g., Hamilton v. City
of New Albany, Indiana, ___ Fed. Appx. ___,
2017 WL 2615453, at *5 (7th Cir. Jun. 16,
2017) (vacating summary judgment for city
on plaintiff’s federal excessive-fines claim
and remanding for trial without mentioning
incorporation or McDonald); Cripps v.
Louisiana Dep’t of Agriculture and Forestry,
819 F.3d 221, 234 (5th Cir. 2016)
(“Assuming arguendo that the Excessive
Fines Clause applies, the record indicates that
each of Plaintiffs’ offenses resulted in fines
that do not exceed the limits prescribed by the
statute authorizing it.”); Discount Inn, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 803 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir.
2015) (holding that “the fines imposed by the
challenged [city] ordinances are not
excessive even if the ‘excessive fines’ clause
is applicable”); Public Employee Retirement
Admin. Comm’n v. Bettencourt, 47 N.E.3d
667, 672 n.7, 681 (Mass. 2016) (holding
forfeiture violates federal excessive-fines
clause based on Cooper without mentioning
McDonald).

Although we ultimately disagree with
our Court of Appeals’ decision to apply the
Excessive Fines Clause to the State’s
forfeiture, we understand the Court’s reason
for doing so. After all, the State specifically
advised the Court that it “need not decide [the
issue of incorporation] … because the
penalties
imposed
were
not
unconstitutionally excessive.” Despite the
State’s choice not to wage the incorporation
battle here, we need not abide a party’s
consent to a misstatement or misapplication
of law. Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022,
1030 (Ind. 2007). We reserve to ourselves—
not the parties—the prerogative to pronounce
what law governs a particular dispute. The
parties’ consensus here to subject the State’s
forfeiture to review under the Clause does not
require that we follow suit. And we decline to
do so, mindful that our colleagues on the
Court of Appeals and the trial court may be
correct in foretelling where the Supreme
Court will one day lead on whether to apply
the Clause to the States.

A second option is to await guidance
from the Supreme Court and decline to find
or assume incorporation until the Supreme
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To be clear, our decision on
incorporation should not be read to prejudge
the merits of pending or prospective
forfeiture challenges based on other
provisions of state or federal law. Our narrow
holding here is confined to the Court of
Appeals’ reliance on a provision of the
United States Constitution—the Excessive
Fines Clause—that the Supreme Court has
never enforced against the States. We decline
to address other potential problems with the
State’s forfeiture because Timbs raised only
an excessive-fines challenge under federal
law.

(i)

Dealing
in
or
manufacturing
cocaine or a narcotic
drug (IC 35-48-4- 1)
***

(iii)

Dealing in a schedule
I, II, or III controlled
substance (IC 35-484-2)
***

II.

Based on the trial court’s findings,
the State proved it is entitled to
forfeit the Land Rover.

(vii)

Because we have resolved the Eighth
Amendment issue against Timbs, we turn to
whether the State proved its entitlement to
forfeit the vehicle under Indiana law. The
governing statute provides, in pertinent part,
that to obtain forfeiture the State must show
that a person used the vehicle to transport an
illicit substance listed in the statute for the
purpose of dealing or possessing the
substance.

Possession of cocaine
or a narcotic drug (IC
35-48-4-6)

I.C. § 34-24-1-1 (Supp. 2012). See also
Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind.
1995).
After a bench trial, the trial court
made the following factual findings
relevant here.
Between the date of purchase, and
May 31st, 2013, [Timbs] drove the
vehicle frequently from Marion to
Richmond to purchase heroin. The
Land Rover was used by [Timbs] to
transport heroin back to Marion.
[Timbs] both used and sold the
heroin. When the Land Rover was
seized by the State at the end of May
2013, the odometer reading was
between 17,000 and 18,000 miles.
The increased mileage primarily
resulted from [Timbs] traveling
between Marion and Richmond to
engage in illegal drug trafficking.

Sec. 1. (a) The following may be
seized:
(1) All vehicles … , if they are used
… by the person … in possession of
them to transport … the following:

(A) A controlled substance for
the purpose of committing
… any of the following:
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On appeal, Timbs challenges these findings
under the corpus-delicti rule, which requires
independent evidence of a crime beyond the
defendant’s confession. But the rule applies
only to an out-of-court confession in a
criminal proceeding and thus does not benefit
Timbs. See Willoughby v. State, 552 N.E.2d
462, 466 (Ind. 1990). Timbs’s inculpatory
testimony occurred in court, while his
counsel was present, in this civil-forfeiture
proceeding, where he admitted to multiple
trips to Richmond in the Land Rover to
acquire heroin and transport it back to
Marion. Because corpus delicti is no obstacle
to the use of Timbs’s testimony, the court’s
findings are supported by the evidence, and
the State proved them by the required
preponderance of the evidence, I.C. § 34-241-4(a). These findings establish each of the
statutory elements recited above to prove the
State’s entitlement to forfeit the Land
Rover—namely, that Timbs used the vehicle
to transport and possess heroin, a schedule I
controlled substance, id. § 35-48-2-4(c)
(Supp. 2013), and a narcotic drug, id. §§ 3548-2-4(c), 35-48-1-20(1) (2008 Repl.), for
the purpose of engaging in illegal drug
trafficking
Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the trial
court’s judgment for Timbs and remand with
instructions to enter judgment for the State on
its forfeiture complaint

Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ.,
concur.
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“Supreme Court Will Decide If Civil Forfeiture is Unconstitutional, Violates The
Eighth Amendment”
Forbes
Nick Sibilla
June 19, 2018
For the first time in over 20 years, the U.S.
Supreme Court will have the opportunity
to review the constitutionality of civil
forfeiture laws, which allow the government
to confiscate cash, cars, and even homes. On
Monday, the court granted a cert petition
from Tyson Timbs, who was forced to forfeit
his $40,000 Land Rover in civil court to the
State of Indiana, after he pled guilty to selling
less than $200 worth of drugs.

worth. That decision was upheld by an
appellate court.
But in November, the Indiana Supreme
Court reversed that decision, and instead
ruled that the Constitution’s Excessive Fines
Clause provided no protection to Hoosiers.
“The Excessive Fines Clause does not bar the
State from forfeiting Defendant’s vehicle,”
the court ruled, “because the United States
Supreme Court has not held that the Clause
applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.”

Like too many Americans, Tyson was
addicted to opioids, at first taking
prescription painkillers before switching to
heroin. When Tyson tried to sell undercover
officers four grams of heroin, he was arrested
in 2013. As punishment, Tyson agreed to
serve one year of house arrest and pay $1,200
in court fees. But the state also wanted his
Land Rover, which Tyson had bought with
life-insurance proceeds after his father died.

After the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, most of the protections guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights were steadily
“incorporated” against the states, including
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “excessive
bail” and “cruel and unusual punishment.”
With this decision, the Indiana Supreme
Court found itself at odds with 14 other state
high courts and two federal appellate circuit
courts, which had all ruled that the Excessive
Fines Clause does, in fact, apply to the states.

Determined to keep his truck, Tyson argued
that forfeiting the Land Rover would violate
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “excessive
fines.” A trial judge agreed and rejected the
forfeiture as “grossly disproportional.” Under
Indiana law, a felony conviction could trigger
a maximum fine of $10,000—less than a
quarter of what Tyson’s Land Rover was

Deprived of both his constitutional rights and
his truck, it’s been hard to “keep my life on
track,” Tyson said. “Without my car, it is
incredibly difficult to do all the things the
government wants me to do to stay clean, like
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visit my probation officer, go to AA, and
keep my job,” he noted. “Fighting to stay
clean is hard enough. I’ve served out my
punishment, but now the government is going
beyond seeking justice. Forfeiture only
makes it more challenging for people in my
position to clean up and become contributing
members of society.”

and far between. Today, just three states have
abolished civil forfeiture, while only 15
states generally require a criminal conviction
to forfeit property. Incredibly, in more than
40 states, once property has been forfeited,
police and prosecutors can take a cut of the
proceeds.
A report by the Institute for Justice found that
annual forfeiture revenue doubled across 14
states between 2002 and 2013, netting law
enforcement hundreds of millions of dollars.
But those programs are utterly dwarfed by the
federal government’s confiscations. From
2001 to 2014, the Justice Department and the
Treasury Department’s forfeiture funds took
in almost $29 billion.

In January, Tyson and the Institute for
Justice, a public interest law firm, filed a cert
petition urging the U.S. Supreme Court to
take the case and overturn the Indiana
Supreme Court’s ruling. Their efforts earned
support from all across the political spectrum,
with the Southern Poverty Law Center, the
Cato Institute, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, and the National Association for
Criminal Defense Lawyers, all filing briefs in
support of Tyson and IJ’s petition.

“This direct financial incentive gives the
government a perverse incentive to abuse this
power, which is exactly what is happening in
Tyson’s case with this excessive fine,” said IJ
Attorney Sam Gedge. “Unless we have
federal protections against excessive fines,
no one’s property is safe.”

With the petition now granted, the U.S.
Supreme Court will decide once and for all
“whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause is incorporated against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Timbs v. Indiana should be the biggest civil
forfeiture case heard by the U.S. Supreme
Court in at least two decades. Although the
court had gone quiet on the issue for years, a
recent string of opinions seem to indicate that
many justices want to police this police
power.

“This case is about more than just a truck,”
said Wesley Hottot, an attorney with the
Institute for Justice. “The Excessive Fines
Clause is a critical check on the government’s
power to punish people and take their
property. Without it, state and local law
enforcement could confiscate everything a
person owns based on a minor crime or—
using civil forfeiture—no crime at all.”

Last year, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a
scathing concurrence against civil forfeiture
when the Supreme Court declined to hear the
case of Lisa Olivia Leonard, who had over
$200,000 in cash confiscated from a traffic
stop in Texas. “This system,” Thomas wrote,
“where police can seize property with limited

Once a legal backwater limited to piracy and
customs cases, civil forfeiture has
robbed tens of thousands of innocent
Americans. Meaningful safeguards are few
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judicial oversight and retain it for their own
use— has led to egregious and wellchronicled abuses.”

treatment apart from other civil proceedings.
Writing in a separate concurrence, he asked,
“Why, for example, would due process
require Congress to speak more clearly when
it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien
than when it wishes to subject a citizen to
indefinite civil commitment, strip him of a
business license essential to his family’s
living, or confiscate his home?”

Thomas further criticized how “forfeiture
operations frequently target the poor and
other groups least able to defend their
interests in forfeiture proceedings,” who in
turn are “more likely to suffer in their daily
lives while they litigate for the return of a
critical item of property, such as a car or a
home.”

“If the severity of the consequences counts
when deciding the standard of review,” he
wrote, “shouldn’t we also take account of the
fact that today’s civil laws regularly impose
penalties far more severe than those found in
many criminal statutes?”

Later that year, the Supreme Court struck
down a Colorado law that bore a striking
resemblance to civil forfeiture. Under the
state’s Exoneration Act, criminal defendants
whose convictions had been overturned were
forced to prove their innocence in civil court
before they could recover any court costs,
fees or restitution they paid. Writing for the
majority in Nelson v. Colorado, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg ruled that “Colorado may not
presume a person, adjudged guilty of no
crime,
nonetheless
guilty enough for
monetary exactions.”

Today’s
“civil”
penalties
include
confiscatory rather than compensatory fines,
forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be
taken, remedies that strip persons of their
professional licenses and livelihoods, and the
power to commit persons against their will
indefinitely. Some of these penalties are
routinely imposed and are routinely graver
than those associated with misdemeanor
crimes— and often harsher than the
punishment for felonies. And not only are
“punitive
civil
sanctions...rapidly
expanding,” they are “sometimes more
severely punitive than the parallel criminal
sanctions for the same conduct.”

And in April, Justice Neil Gorsuch called out
civil forfeiture when he joined the majority
n Sessions v. Dimaya, which ruled against the
Justice Department for relying on an
“unconstitutionally vague” deportation law.
Deportation is a civil, not criminal,
proceeding, but because it is “a particularly
severe penalty,” the Supreme Court held that
deportation should be scrutinized under a
more stringent standard of review.

With Timbs v. Indiana, the Supreme Court
has a new opportunity to roll back unduly
harsh civil penalties. A victory for Tyson
would vindicate the constitutional rights of
all Americans from the government’s
grasping hand.

Gorsuch, however, rejected the notion that
deportation should be singled out for special
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“He Sold Drugs for $225. Indiana Took His $42,000 Land Rover”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 25, 2018
Tyson Timbs would like his Land Rover
back.

agreed to pay an array of fees and fines
adding up to about $1,200.

The State of Indiana took it, using a law that
lets it seize vehicles used to transport illegal
drugs. Last week, the Supreme Court agreed
to decide whether the Constitution has
anything to say about such civil forfeiture
laws, which allow states and localities to take
and keep private property used to commit
crimes.

But Indiana wanted more. Using the civil
forfeiture law, it took the Land Rover.
Mr. Timbs, 37, has put his life back together,
but it has not been easy. “I have to go to
meetings, to counseling, to probation
appointments,” he said, making clear that he
was not complaining.
“They want you to get a job,” he said. “It’s
hard to do without a vehicle. Plus, I was a
felon, which makes it even harder to find a
job.”

Mr. Timbs bought the Land Rover after his
father died. The life insurance money
amounted to around $73,000, and he spent
$42,000 of it on the vehicle. He blew most of
the rest on drugs.

He found work as a machinist in a factory
some 40 minutes from his home in Marion,
Ind., where he lives with his aunt. He borrows
her car to get to work, and he feels guilty
about that.

“Unfortunately, I had a whole bunch of
money, which isn’t a good idea for a drug
addict to have,” Mr. Timbs recalled the other
day. “I used a lot, and eventually the money
ran out. It was an addict’s life.”

“She has to take a bus back and forth to her
kidney dialysis appointments,” he said.

Mr. Timbs’s habit started with an opioid
addiction and progressed to heroin. He used
his Land Rover to get drugs and, on at least
two occasions, to sell them. The buyers were
undercover police officers.

As Justice Clarence Thomas explained last
year in an opinion urging the Supreme Court
to examine civil forfeiture laws, government
seizures of property used to commit crimes
have become worrisomely popular.

Mr. Timbs pleaded guilty to one of the drug
sales, in which $225 had changed hands, and
he was sentenced to a year of house arrest
followed by five years of probation. He also

“Forfeiture has in recent decades become
widespread and highly profitable,” Justice
Thomas wrote. “And because the law
103

“The amount of the forfeiture sought is
excessive and is grossly disproportional to
the gravity of the defendant’s offense,” Judge
Todd wrote.

enforcement entity responsible for seizing the
property often keeps it, these entities have
strong incentives to pursue forfeiture.”
“This system — where police can seize
property with limited judicial oversight and
retain it for their own use — has led to
egregious and well-chronicled abuses,” he
wrote, citing excellent reporting from The
Washington Post and The New Yorker.

An appeals court agreed. In dissent, Judge
Michael P. Barnes wrote that civil forfeiture
laws can be abused but that Mr. Timbs should
lose the vehicle.
“I am keenly aware of the overreach some
law enforcement agencies have exercised in
some of these cases,” Judge Barnes wrote.
“Entire family farms are sometimes forfeited
based on one family member’s conduct, or
exorbitant amounts of money are seized.
However, it seems to me that one who deals
heroin, and there is no doubt from the record
we are talking about a dealer, must and
should suffer the legal consequences to
which he exposes himself.”

The burdens of civil forfeiture fall
disproportionately on the poor, said Wesley
P. Hottot, a lawyer with the Institute for
Justice, which represents Mr. Timbs.
“Tyson’s case illustrates how civil forfeiture
makes it harder for people who have made
mistakes to correct those mistakes and reenter society,” Mr. Hottot said. “It shouldn’t
take the United States Supreme Court to
make clear that you don’t take everything
from a person who’s facing the kinds of
challenges Tyson is.”

The Indiana Supreme Court ruled against Mr.
Timbs, on interesting grounds. It said the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
excessive fines did not apply to ones imposed
by states.

Mr. Timbs won the early rounds in Indiana’s
lawsuit seeking to take his vehicle, based on
the Eighth Amendment, which says that
“excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”

This is, surprisingly, an open question. The
Bill of Rights originally restricted the power
of only the federal government, but the
Supreme Court has ruled that most of its
protections apply to the states under the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment, one
of the post-Civil War amendments.

Judge Jeffrey D. Todd, of the Grant County
Superior Court, said the amendment’s second
clause — the one barring “excessive fines”
— protected Mr. Timbs. The Land Rover, the
judge wrote, was worth about four times the
maximum fine Mr. Timbs could have been
ordered to pay, which was $10,000. It was
also worth more than 30 times the fines that
were actually imposed.

But there are a few exceptions, and the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent about
where it stands on the excessive fines clause.
Mr. Timbs’s case is poised to resolve the
question. It will be argued in the fall.
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In the meantime, Mr. Timbs sometimes
lapses into frustration and bitterness.

more than addiction. I struggle with anxiety
and depression. I don’t feel like much of a
man, because I don’t have a vehicle.”

“I don’t deserve this,” he said. “Nobody does.
It’s an unnecessary stressor. I struggle with
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“Keeping Cops’ Hands Out of Your Pockets”
The American Conservative
Brian Saady
July 16, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to
rule on a case that could have a major impact
on civil liberties and whether civil asset
forfeiture can continue to serve as low
hanging fruit for bureaucratic interests run
amok.

Excessive Fines Clause, and that it is a matter
for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine.
Fourteen other states already adhere to the
Excessive Fines Clause, but Indiana and three
others do not, according to the ABA Journal.
Virtually every civil rights organization
supports Timbs on the merits of this case.
Furthermore, there are historic undertones
that
prompted
the Constitutional
Accountability Center to file a friend-of-thecourt brief requesting that U.S. Supreme
Court hear this case.

Timbs v. Indiana involves a man whose
$42,000 Land Rover was confiscated via civil
asset forfeiture. Attorneys from the
libertarian public-interest law firm, Institute
for Justice, don’t deny their client Tyson
Timbs was convicted of selling $385 worth
of heroin in two transactions and that his
vehicle was used in the sale.

That organization points to the early Jim
Crow era in which black men were often
victims of police persecution and assessed
excessive fines for petty offenses. According
to Douglas A. Blackmon’s book, Slavery by
Another Name, as many as 200,000 black
men were forced into debt peonage in the
post-Civil War era.

What they do contest is that the confiscation
of the Land Rover (purchased with a payment
from a life insurance policy, not drug money)
was unconstitutional under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the 8th Amendment.
How is that? Due to a plea bargain, Timbs
was sentenced to one year of house arrest and
five years of probation. He was also assessed
a total of $1,200 in fees and fines. The
offense carries a maximum fine of $10,000.
Hence, Timbs’ attorneys assert the
confiscation of a $42,000 car exceeds what he
was liable for in the first place.

The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on
the Excessive Fines Clause. With that said, if
it rules in favor of Timbs, such a decision will
not fully overturn the practice of civil asset
forfeiture. However, it could rein in one
major aspect of its abuses.
This unjust practice has gradually become a
standardized tool of the law enforcement
community.
Remarkably,
federal
agencies seized over $5 billion in 2014,

The Indiana Supreme Court didn’t rule
whether the forfeiture was excessive. Instead,
it ruled that the state wasn’t subject to the
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which was more than the amount of property
burglarized that same year, $3.9 billion.

fact, eighty-seven
percent of
forfeitures are civil, not criminal.

federal

Suffice it to say, civil asset forfeiture is
padding municipal budgets. One of the more
glaring examples of this self-serving dynamic
came from a seminar led by Harry S.
Connelly Jr., a city attorney for Las Cruces,
New Mexico. His zealous support for civil
asset forfeiture made it clear that law
enforcement is often more focused upon
raising revenue, rather than public safety.

The reason is that the government has to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case. On the other hand, the
presumption of innocence doesn’t exist in a
civil asset forfeiture case.
The defendant is technically the property that
was seized. The owner must prove in court,
with a preponderance of evidence, that the
property wasn’t used to commit a crime or
derived from criminal activity.

In particular, Connelly lauded a scenario in
which parents lost their $300,000 house after
their son was caught selling $10 of marijuana
outside of their home.“Just think what you
could do as a legal department. We could be
czars. We could own the city. We could be in
the real estate business,” said Connelly.

This
is
an
un-American
and
counterproductive
practice
that
is
fundamentally opposed to constitutional
principles. For this, among other reasons, are
why 84 percent of Americans oppose civil
asset forfeiture.

Media attention generally focuses on
draconian cases involving high-dollar
figures, cars, or homes that were confiscated
by the government. However, one of the
more perverse aspects of civil asset forfeiture
is the manner in which much smaller amounts
of money are routinely confiscated by police.

This is such an egregious issue that it
motivated the generally reticent Justice
Clarence Thomas to comment on Leonard v
Texas. In that case, the police confiscated
$201,100 in cash during a traffic stop. The
money, along with the bill of sale for a
Pennsylvania home, was located in a safe
inside the trunk of the car.

To be exact, the median forfeiture in Chicago
was $1,049, according to a study by Reason
Magazine and the Lucy Parsons Lab. That’s
particularly disturbing because it generally
costs at least $2,000 in legal and court fees to
recover your assets. In other words, even if
you’re willing to climb through a pile of red
tape, it’s pointless to recover your assets in
most cases.

Thomas pointed to wide misconduct
associated with civil forfeitures. He even
cited a few news reports and a research paper
by the Institute for Justice, Policing for
Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture.
However, Thomas reluctantly ruled that the
court couldn’t hear the case because those
issues weren’t addressed at the lower court
level first.

Moreover, unlike Timbs v. Indiana, the vast
majority of civil asset forfeiture cases don’t
involve a corresponding criminal case. In
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Nonetheless, Thomas clearly expressed
interest in ruling on this issue with future
cases.

With that in mind, Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s eventual replacement looms large
in the case of Timbs v. Indiana, which will be
heard in the next session of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Kennedy often ruled in favor of civil
rights issues.

“(I)t is unclear whether courts historically
permitted forfeiture actions to proceed civilly
in all respects. Some of this Court’s early
cases suggested that forfeiture actions were
in the nature of criminal proceedings.
Whether forfeiture is characterized as civil or
criminal carries important implications for a
variety of procedural protections, including
the right to a jury trial and the proper standard
of proof.”

To reiterate, the Supreme Court can’t
overturn all of the wrongs associated with
civil asset forfeiture in this one case.
However, a favorable ruling in Timbs v.
Indiana would certainly curtail some of the
most flagrant abuses. Furthermore, it could
lead to future cases that finally terminate this
unjust and unconstitutional practice.
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“Supreme Court affirms Land Rover forfeiture in drug case”

The Indiana Lawyer
Olivia Covington
November 2, 2017
The state of Indiana can move forward with
its plan to seize a Land Rover worth more
than $40,000 from a convicted heroin dealer
after the Indiana Supreme Court ruled the
Eighth Amendment does not bar the state
from making such a forfeiture.

would be an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment. The court noted that the
maximum fine for Timbs’ Class B felony was
$10,000, but the vehicle was worth roughly
four times that amount.
A divided panel of the Indiana Court of
Appeals upheld that decision in October
2016, with Judge Michael Barnes dissenting.
But after hearing oral arguments in March,
the Supreme Court upheld the state’s
forfeiture action.

The justices handed down that decision
Thursday in State of Indiana v. Tyson Timbs,
27S04-1702-MI-70. That case began in
January 2013, when Tyson Timbs used his
father’s life insurance proceeds to purchase a
Land Rover for roughly $42,000.

Justice Geoffrey Slaughter, who wrote for the
unanimous panel of justices, first wrote in his
Thursday opinion that the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause has
not been applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme
Court noted in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761-63 (2010) that
the excessive fines clause has not been
incorporated to the states, and Slaughter
wrote the Indiana high court declined to
“subject Indiana to a federal test that may
operate to impede development of our own
excessive-fines jurisprudence under the
Indiana Constitution.”

Timbs then used the Land Rover to buy and
transport heroin throughout Marion until he
was arrested as part of a series of controlled
buys. The Land Rover had 1,237 miles on its
odometer when Timbs purchased it, but by
the time police seized it in May 2013, it had
more than 17,000 miles.
In 2015, Timbs pleaded guilty to Class B
felony dealing and Class D felony conspiracy
to commit theft in exchange for the state
dismissing a third charge against him. The
Grant Superior Court sentenced Timbs to six
years, with one year executed, while he
agreed to pay $1,203 in fees and costs.

“To be clear, our decision on incorporation
should not be read to prejudge the merits of
pending or prospective forfeiture challenges
based on other provisions of state or federal

The state also moved to seize the Land Rover
through civil forfeiture, but the trial court
denied that action, finding the forfeiture
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law,” Slaughter continued. “Our narrow
holding here is confined to the Court of
Appeals’ reliance on a provision of the
United States Constitution – the Excessive
Fines Clause – that the Supreme Court has
never enforced against the States.”

Rover under the statutory provisions in
Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-1 (Supp.
2012) by proving that Timbs used the vehicle
to transport and possess heroin to engage in
illegal trafficking. Thus, the trial court’s
decision was reversed, and the case was
remanded to enter judgment for the state on
its forfeiture complaint.

Slaughter then went on to write the state
proved it was entitled to forfeit the Land

110

Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania
Ruling Below: Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 2017)
Overview: The Court has previously ruled that in order for a property owner to file a lawsuit in
federal court, an owner must pursue all available state-court remedies. Rose Mary Knick owns 90
acres of land in rural Pennsylvania. In 2012 the town where Knick’s property is located passed an
ordinance that requires all owners of cemeteries to provide public access to those sites during
daylight hours through a right of way from the nearest road. Knick has a private cemetery on her
land and the town claims the ordinance still applies. Knick went first to state court to challenge the
ordinance, but the Pennsylvania court declined to rule on her lawsuit because the town had
withdrawn its notice of violation and agreed not to enforce the law against Knick. When Knick
went to federal court, the district court dismissed her claims on the ground that Knick had not
exhausted her state court options.
Issue: (1) Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank that requires property owners to exhaust state
court remedies to ripen federal takings claims; and (2) whether Williamson County’s ripeness
doctrine bars review of takings claims that assert that a law causes an unconstitutional taking on
its face, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 6th, 9th and 10th Circuits hold, or whether facial
claims are exempt from Williamson County, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 4th and 7th
Circuits hold.
Rose Mary KNICK, Appellant
v.
TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT; Carl S. Ferraro, Individual and in his Official Capacity as Scott
Township Code Enforcement Officer
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided on July 6, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SMITH, Chief Judge:

property within the Township to determine
the existence and location of any cemetery.
The ordinance also compels property owners
to hold their private cemeteries open to the
public during daylight hours. The plaintiff,
Rose Mary Knick, challenges the ordinance
on two grounds. First, Knick argues that the

On December 20, 2012, the Township
of
Scott
in
Lackawanna
County,
Pennsylvania
enacted
an
ordinance
regulating cemeteries. The ordinance
authorizes officials to enter upon any

111

ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of
private property in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Second, Knick argues that the
ordinance takes private property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.

during daylight hours. No owner . . . shall
unreasonably restrict access to the general
public nor shall any fee for access be
charged.” Id. We will refer to this as the
“public-access provision.”
Second, the Ordinance permits the
Township’s “Code Enforcement Officer
and/or his/her agents and representatives [to]
enter upon any property within the Township
for the purposes of determining the existence
of and location of any cemetery, in order to
ensure compliance with the terms and
provisions of this Ordinance.” Id. We will
refer to this as the “inspection provision.”

The Township’s ordinance is
extraordinary and constitutionally suspect.
However,
important
justiciability
considerations preclude us from reaching the
merits. Because Knick concedes that her
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
and fails to demonstrate that they imminently
will be, Knick lacks standing to advance her
Fourth Amendment challenge. And as the
District Court correctly held, Knick’s Fifth
Amendment claims are not ripe until she has
sought and been denied just compensation
using Pennsylvania’s inversecondemnation
procedures, as required by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
We will therefore affirm.

Anyone who violates the Ordinance is
subject to a fine of between $300 and $600,
and “[e]ach day that the violation exists shall
constitute a separate offense.” Id.
On April 10, 2013, the Township
Code Enforcement Officer, Carl S. Ferraro,
entered Knick’s property without an
administrative warrant. Ferraro identified
certain stones on Knick’s property as grave
markers and issued a Notice of Violation
dated April 11, 2013. Knick disputes that a
cemetery exists on her property

I
On December 20, 2012, the Township
of Scott enacted Ordinance No. 12-12-20001, titled “Ordinance of the Township of
Scott Township [sic], Lackawanna County,
Pennsylvania, Relating to the Operation and
Maintenance of Cemeteries and Burial
Places” (hereinafter, the “Ordinance”). App.
82. The Ordinance applies to “[a]ll
cemeteries, whether private or public, and
whether existing or established prior to the
date of this Ordinance or hereafter created.”
Id. It requires cemetery owners to “properly
maintain and upkeep any cemetery.” App. 83.

On May 7, 2013, Knick brought suit
against the Township in the Lackawanna
County Court of Common Pleas seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Knick filed
an Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief
on or about that same date. The parties
stipulated that the Township would withdraw
its Notice of Violation and further stipulated
to an order staying any enforcement actions
against Knick. A hearing was held on
October 8, 2014. Then, on October 21, the
Court ruled that it “will render no decision on
the matter.” App. 261. Specifically, the Court
ruled “that it is not the proper venue for this
matter, since the case is not in the proper
posture for a decision to be rendered on the

Critical to this case are two provisions
of the Ordinance. First, it requires that “[a]ll
cemeteries within the Township shall be kept
open and accessible to the general public
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Plaintiff’s requested forms of relief.” Id.
Then, on October 31, the Township issued
another Notice of Violation. Knick filed a
Petition for Contempt of Court in the
Lackawanna County Court of Common
Pleas, which the Court denied on January 30,
2015. At no point did Knick institute an
inverse-condemnation proceeding against the
Township. See 26 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. §
502(c).

private property without just compensation,
in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments; and (III) claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief because,
inter alia, the Ordinance unconstitutionally
takes Knick’s property and authorizes
unconstitutional searches. By Order dated
September 7, 2016, the District Court
dismissed Count I with prejudice for the
reasons provided in its earlier decision and
dismissed Counts II and III without prejudice
pending exhaustion of state-law remedies.

Knick filed this action on November
20, 2014 in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In
her original Complaint, Knick asserted four
Counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (I) Fourth
Amendment claims against the Township for
maintaining a warrantless inspection regime
(the facial challenge) and entering Knick’s
property without a warrant (the as-applied
challenge); (II) a Fourth Amendment claim
against the Township for failure to train its
officials to obtain administrative warrants;
(III) Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims against Ferraro in his official capacity
for entering Knick’s property without a
warrant; and (IV) claims seeking invalidation
of the Ordinance on Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, including,
inter alia, vagueness, improper exercise of
the Township’s police power, and taking
private property without just compensation.
After the Township filed its motion to
dismiss, Knick filed an Amended Complaint,
which added Count V for declaratory and
injunctive relief. By Order dated October 28,
2015, the District Court dismissed Counts I–
III with prejudice and dismissed Counts IV
and V without prejudice.

This appeal timely followed. On
appeal, Knick argues that the District Court
erred by dismissing her Fourth Amendment
facial challenge and by requiring her to
exhaust state-law remedies for her takings
claims.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the
district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
must assure ourselves of our jurisdiction sua
sponte, see, e.g., Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc.
v. Glickman, 190 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir.
1999). Although the District Court dismissed
Knick’s Second Amended Complaint
without prejudice as to certain claims, we
conclude that Knick nonetheless appealed
from a final decision.
A final, appealable decision is one
“by which a district court disassociates itself
from a case.” Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015) (quoting Swint v.
Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42
(1995)). “While decisions of the Court have
accorded § 1291 a practical rather than a
technical construction, the statute’s core
application is to rulings that terminate an
action.” Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). For that reason, dismissals

Knick filed a Second Amended
Complaint on November 16, 2015. The
Second Amended Complaint asserts three
Counts: (I) the Fourth Amendment claims
pled in Count I of the original complaint; (II)
a claim that the Ordinance takes Knick’s
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in state court.” Erie Cty. Retirees Ass’n v.
Cty. of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir.
2000). The decision in this case is therefore
final “even if a similar case may be filed in
the future because the dismissal was without
prejudice.” Schering-Plough Healthcare
Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586
F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2009); see also
Limnia, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 857
F.3d 379, 385–86 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC
Plan, 851 F.3d 552, 557–58 (6th Cir. 2017);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d
215, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] dismissal
without prejudice, absent some retention of
jurisdiction, is a final decision . . . .”); cf.
Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595,
602 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissal without
prejudice in favor of arbitration is appealable
where the District Court did not retain
jurisdiction, even though further court
proceedings
may
ensue
following
arbitration).

without prejudice are ordinarily not final;
leave to amend contemplates “further
proceedings in the district court as part of the
same action.” Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159,
165 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 560 (3d
Cir. 1997)).
But “[e]ven dismissals without
prejudice have been held to be final and
appealable if they end [ ][the] suit so far as
the District Court was concerned.” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting GFL
Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d
189, 198 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also United
States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S.
793, 794 n.1 (1949). For example, we will
review a dismissal without prejudice if a
plaintiff stands on the complaint rather than
exercising leave to amend, Palakovic v.
Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219 (3d Cir. 2017), if a
plaintiff
argues
that
administrative
exhaustion would be futile, Ghana v.
Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180–81 (3d Cir.
2000), or if a plaintiff’s claims are
“effectively barred” from being subsequently
reasserted due to the running of a statute of
limitations or some similar obstacle, LNC
Invs., LLC v. Republic Nicar., 396 F.3d 342,
346 (3d Cir. 2005).

Thus, we are satisfied that the District
Court’s decision is a “final” one, and we have
appellate jurisdiction under § 1291. We
proceed to Knick’s claims.
III
We begin with Knick’s facial Fourth
Amendment challenge. We conclude that she
lacks Article III standing because she has
failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and
redressability.

Here, the District Court dismissed
Knick’s takings claim without prejudice and
directed her to exhaust state remedies. The
District Court did not retain jurisdiction and
closed the case. Its order further specified
that, following the conclusion of state
proceedings, any remaining takings claims
must be “re-fil[ed] . . . in federal court.” App.
57. As such, “there cannot be—and, by court
order, there will not be—any further
proceedings in the district court as part of the
same action.” Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 560.
“[T]he district court has divested itself of
[the] case entirely, regardless of the fact that
claims in the case may continue to go forward

A
The Second Amended Complaint
asserts both facial and as-applied challenges
to the Ordinance under the Fourth
Amendment. As part of her as-applied
challenge, Knick claimed to be injured by an
unlawful search of her property. But the
District Court ruled that the search in
question was lawful, and Knick does not
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grievances).
Furthermore,
“[a]lthough
imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic
concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its
purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged
injury is not too speculative for Article III
purposes—that the injury is certainly
impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 564 n.2). If the injury is sufficient
under those standards, it must also be “fairly
traceable to the challenged action[] and
redressable by a favorable ruling” in
accordance with the remaining two elements
of standing. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149
(2010)).

appeal that ruling. Although not initially
raised by the parties, the question before us is
whether Knick may persist in her facial
Fourth Amendment challenge even though
her own rights were not violated. Following
supplemental briefing and oral argument by
the parties, we conclude that Knick has failed
to carry her burden to demonstrate Article III
standing to challenge the Ordinance on
Fourth Amendment grounds.
“[T]he irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three
elements”: injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560– 61 (1992). As “[t]he party
invoking federal jurisdiction,” Knick “bears
the burden of establishing these elements.”
Id. at 561. “Plaintiffs must have standing at
all stages of the litigation,” and certain
findings by a district court may require a
subsequent reevaluation of standing. Pub.
Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v.
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117
(3d Cir. 1997).

In this case, the District Court ruled
that the search of Knick’s property complied
with the Fourth Amendment because Ferraro
searched an open field. “[A]n open field,
unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of
those protected areas enumerated in the
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (citation omitted)
(citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
176–77 (1984)). Because Knick does not
challenge that ruling on appeal, she has
accepted the District Court’s conclusion that
her Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated. She has likewise accepted that her
property was not even “searched” in the
constitutional sense. Id. at 411 n.8. Even if
Township officials were likely to return to the
same part of Knick’s property for further
inspections, those would also be open-field
searches not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection. As discussed below, nothing in
the record suggests that any future
inspections would invade her home’s
curtilage.

The first element, injury in fact, “is
often determinative.” Toll Bros. v. Twp. of
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir.
2009). The plaintiff must demonstrate “an
invasion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
(citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). To be concrete, an injury need not
be “tangible,” but “it must actually exist.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1548–49 (2016). “For an injury to be
‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in
a personal and individual way.’” Id. at 1548
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
Generalized grievances will not suffice. See
Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d
336, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing
between generalized and widely shared

As a result, any “injury” arising from
open-field searches would not be legally
protected. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S.
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000)
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(“The interest must consist of obtaining
compensation for, or preventing, the
violation of a legally protected right.”). Nor
would that injury be redressable. If we were
to enjoin the Ordinance’s inspection
provision today, the Township would still be
able to use the open-fields doctrine to enter
the part of Knick’s property where a
cemetery was allegedly discovered. Put
differently, Knick’s situation is one “for
which [the Ordinance] is irrelevant”; the
Ordinance does “no work” in authorizing
searches that would be independently lawful
under established Fourth Amendment
doctrines. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct.
2443, 2451 (2015).

“actual or imminent, not conjectural and
hypothetical” injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
(internal quotation marks omitted). Simply
owning property subject to a hypothetical
search is “too speculative for Article III
purposes.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
Compare id. at 1148 (holding that plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring facial Fourth
Amendment challenge to a statute
authorizing NSA surveillance because
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a “certainly
impending” risk that their communications
would be intercepted), with Free Speech
Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 825 F.3d 149,
166–67 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs
demonstrated standing to bring facial Fourth
Amendment challenge where, inter alia, the
plaintiffs incurred costs complying with a
regulation that specifically targeted their type
of business).

Perhaps realizing these deficiencies,
Knick changed tack in her supplemental
brief. Now Knick attempts to premise
standing on the fact that the Ordinance may
permit the Township to search the curtilage
of her home—an area of her property that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment. See
Knick Supp. Br. 3 (“Knick owns property,
including curtilage, subject to this provision.
She has alleged the Ordinance authorizes an
invasion of her property. That is enough for
standing, particularly at this early stage.”
(citations omitted)).

Accordingly, we conclude that Knick
failed to demonstrate a redressable injury-infact and therefore lacks standing.
B
In an attempt to salvage her Fourth
Amendment claim, Knick argues that she has
standing to assert a pure facial challenge
without raising, much less proving, an
accompanying as-applied challenge. Our
holding, however, is rooted in time-tested
principles of justiciability, not in any special
attribute of facial or as-applied challenges.
As courts and commentators have
recognized, those labels often introduce
confusion, and “the distinction . . . is not so
well defined that it has some automatic
effect.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010); see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1336 (2000) [hereinafter
Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges]
(arguing that facial and as-applied challenges

There are two problems with this
theory. First, simply owning property
protected by the Fourth Amendment
describes a generalized grievance common to
all residents of the Township. See Lujan, 504
U.S. at 575–76. We have recognized standing
to challenge government search programs
that are “universal in scope,” but not before
ensuring that the plaintiffs’ injuries were
“unmistakably personal.” Schuchardt, 839
F.3d at 346. Knick has not alleged any
personal harm arising from a threatened or
actual curtilage search. Second, Knick cannot
base standing on a future invasion of her
home’s curtilage without demonstrating an
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are not “sharply categorically distinct”).
Nonetheless, there are several points about
the interaction between those concepts that
we must clarify.

Cir. 2007) (declining to extend the solicitude
shown in the “highly exceptional First
Amendment context” to facial challenges
raised under the Ex Post Facto and Due
Process clauses).

As a general matter, Knick’s
argument is correct: there is no requirement
that a facial challenge be accompanied by an
as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Patel, 135 S.
Ct. 2443. Litigants with standing to challenge
a law have considerable “flexibility . . . to
shape the issues in litigation.” Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial
Challenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 947 (2011)
[hereinafter Fallon, Fact and Fiction].
Litigants may argue that the law cannot be
constitutionally applied to them due to some
particular set of facts or circumstances (an asapplied challenge), that the law is
unconstitutional in every application,
including their own (a facial challenge), or
both.

Plaintiffs with standing to challenge a
law may assert solely facial challenges, but in
doing so they accept a higher substantive
burden. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
intoned, facial challenges are “the most
difficult . . . to mount successfully” because
the challenger “must establish that no set of
circumstances exist under which the [statute]
would be valid.” Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2449,
2450 (alterations in original) (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987)).8 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
discouraged litigants from asserting facial
challenges—particularly where surveying the
full range of possible applications is made
difficult by a barebones record or a need for
technical expertise. See, e.g., Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552
U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008) (noting that facial
challenges are disfavored because, in part,
they “threaten to short circuit the democratic
process”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 167 (2007) (noting that facial challenges
to an abortion-related law “should not have
been entertained in the first instance,” and
instead should have been presented as
“preenforcement, as-applied challenges” so
that the Court could better assess “the nature
of the medical risk” alleged); Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 608–10 (2004) (noting
that “facial challenges are best when
infrequent” because “they invite judgments
on fact-poor records” and “depart[] from the
norms of adjudication in federal courts”).

However, even if a litigant does not
allege a violation as applied, the law in
question must still typically be applied— or
at least be at risk of imminent application.
That is because plaintiffs must always
demonstrate the “irreducible constitutional
minimum” of Article III standing. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560. Facial challenges are no
exception. See Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d
466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Furthermore, as a
prudential matter, a party “must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest
his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.” Kowalski v.
Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
That prudential rule is relaxed in certain
doctrinal contexts, most notably in First
Amendment claims.7 See Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973);
Osediacz v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136,
140–41 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Pa. Prison
Soc’y v. Cortés, 508 F.3d 156, 168–69 (3d

If a litigant decides to bring both
types of challenge, a court’s ruling on one
might affect the other. For example, ruling
that a law is facially invalid “negates any
need” to address an as-applied challenge.
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Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 65 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2014). But if a litigant loses an as-applied
challenge because the court rules as a matter
of law that the statute or ordinance was
constitutionally applied to her, it follows a
fortiori that the law is not unconstitutional in
all applications. Dickerson v. Napolitano,
604 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 2010); see also
Cty. Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S.
140, 154–56 (1979) (holding that criminal
defendants could not mount a facial
challenge to a statute that had been
constitutionally applied at their trial); United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24–25 (1960);
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882–
83 (4th Cir. 2013); Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d
927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005). If the litigant loses
an as-applied challenge because the law was
not in fact applied, or the law did no work in
authorizing the Government’s challenged
conduct, then courts should be careful to
ensure that any remaining challenges are
justiciable. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U.S. 552, 569 (2011) (noting that, in Los
Angeles Police Department v. United
Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32,
40–41 (1999), a facial challenge was
unavailable because “the plaintiff had not
suffered a personal First Amendment injury
and could prevail only by invoking the rights
of others”).

and Fiction at 963. And of course, a litigant
who fails to prove that a law is
unconstitutional in all applications might still
prove that it was applied unconstitutionally to
her. Cf. Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305 (2016)
(holding that losing earlier preenforcment
facial challenge did not preclude
postenforcement as-applied challenge).
A recent illustration of these
principles is Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct.
2443 (2015), where the Supreme Court
approved of a standalone facial challenge
arising under the Fourth Amendment. Patel
involved an ordinance that authorized law
enforcement officials to search hotel
registries without an administrative warrant.
Several hotel operators sued, claiming that
the ordinance was facially invalid. In Patel,
the challenged ordinance had been, and
would have continued to be, applied against
the hotels to authorize warrantless searches.
The parties stipulated as much, satisfying the
imminence requirement. Id. at 2448. Thus,
the plaintiffs presented a dispute about
whether their rights would be violated as a
function of the ordinance’s facial validity.
Similarly, in our recent decision in Free
Speech Coalition, the plaintiffs demonstrated
an imminent risk that they would be
subjected to an allegedly unconstitutional
inspection regime. 825 F.3d at 166–67. Their
rights likewise turned on the facial validity of
the law in question.

On the other hand, there are situations
where a failure on one claim might not
preclude success on the other. If a litigant
loses an as-applied challenge because the
allegedly unconstitutional circumstances of
enforcement are simply “not supported by
[the] record,” Heffner, 745 F.3d at 65 n.7, and
the litigant otherwise has standing to
challenge a law (such as a defendant in an
enforcement action), then “a court cannot
simply refuse to address a facial challenge
that offers a defendant her last chance to
argue that the statute being enforced against
her is constitutionally invalid.” Fallon, Fact

Not so here. Knick makes no
reasonable allegation that her Fourth
Amendment rights (or anyone else’s) were,
or will imminently be, violated. The fact that
Knick challenges the Ordinance on its face
does not relieve her from that fundamental
burden.

*
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state-law compensation remedies, because
Knick did not pursue inverse-condemnation
proceedings under Pennsylvania’s Eminent
Domain Code, 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 101
et seq. See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d
286, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
plaintiffs’ takings claim was not ripe because
they did not file an inverse-condemnation
petition). Knick responds that she was not
required to pursue inverse-condemnation
proceedings for three reasons. First, Knick
argues that her facial takings claim is exempt
from exhaustion. Second, Knick argues that
she did in fact comply with Williamson
County by unsuccessfully suing for
declaratory and injunctive relief in state
court. And third, Knick argues that we should
overlook Williamson County’s prudential
requirements in the interest of efficiency. We
reject all three arguments.

We recognize that the Ordinance’s
inspection provision “is constitutionally
suspect and we encourage the [Township] to
abandon it (or, at least, to modify it
substantially).” Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 143. It
is difficult to imagine a broader authorization
to conduct searches of privately owned
property. But we are not a “roving
commission[] assigned to pass judgment on
the validity of the Nation’s laws.” Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 611. We cannot adjudicate the
merits of the inspection provision without a
plaintiff who has a cognizable interest in the
outcome. Accordingly, we will affirm the
dismissal of Knick’s remaining Fourth
Amendment claim on the alternative ground
that Knick lacks standing
IV
We turn then to Knick’s Fifth
Amendment takings claims. Knick argues
that the Ordinance effectuates an
uncompensated taking of her private property
by requiring her to hold her land open to the
public and to Township inspectors.

A
First, Knick argues that her facial
takings claim need not be exhausted through
state-court procedures. Specifically, Knick
asserts that this Court wrongly decided
County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury,
442 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006), the case relied
upon by the District Court, which required
exhaustion for a similar facial claim. We
cannot overrule our own precedent, but we
nonetheless conclude that Knick’s argument
is misplaced.

Before a takings claim is ripe,
plaintiffs should (subject to certain
exceptions) comply with two prudential
requirements set forth in the Supreme Court’s
decision Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). First, the
“finality rule” requires that the government
“has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regulation to the property
at issue.” Id. at 186. Second, the plaintiff
must seek and be denied just compensation
using the state’s procedures, provided those
procedures are adequate. Id. at 194.

There is no question that the first
prong of Williamson County, the finality rule,
does not apply to “a claim that the mere
enactment of a regulation . . . constitutes a
taking without just compensation.” Id. at 164.
That exception to the finality rule makes
sense: if the mere enactment of the ordinance
constitutes a taking, there would be no need
to wait for any “final decision.” See CMR
D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d
612, 626–27 (3d Cir. 2013).

In this case, the Township argues that
Knick failed to comply with the second
Williamson County prong, exhaustion of
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Court has used the word “facial” to refer to a
type of legal challenge that seeks to
invalidate a taking rather than obtain just
compensation. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 534
(describing a facial challenge as one that
“does not depend on the extent to which
petitioners are . . . compensated”). These two
uses of the term “facial” are conceptually
distinct.

The question before us is whether
facial claims are also exempt from the second
prong of Williamson County, the exhaustion
of state-law compensation remedies. In
County Concrete, this Court held that “a
facial Just Compensation Takings claim . . .
does not relieve [plaintiffs] from the duty to
seek just compensation from the state.” 442
F.3d at 168. The District Court correctly
applied that holding here.

Regarding the first use—“facial
taking”—it is important to understand that
the government does not violate the Fifth
Amendment simply because one of its
actions “constitutes a taking.” Bituminous
Coal, 480 U.S. at 494. The Fifth Amendment
“does not prohibit the taking of private
property, but instead places a condition on
the exercise of that power”: the provision of
just compensation. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A.,
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987); see Cty. Concrete,
442 F.3d at 168 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment
bars not just the taking of property, but the
taking
of
property
without
just
compensation.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Thus, “even if a zoning ordinance,
on its face, ‘takes’ property for Fifth
Amendment purposes, no constitutional
violation occurs until the state refuses to
justly compensate the property owner.”
Sinclair Oil, 96 F.3d at 406. Accordingly, a
facial taking is not automatically
unconstitutional; it simply “gives rise to an
unqualified constitutional obligation to
compensate” the property owner. TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320 (2002).

Knick argues, however, that our
decision in County Concrete is contrary to
Supreme Court authority. For example, in
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, the
Supreme Court stated that the petitioners
“have overstated the reach of Williamson
County throughout this litigation” because
the petitioners were “never required to ripen”
their facial claims. 545 U.S. 323, 345 (2005).
Similarly, in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, the Supreme Court noted
that facial challenges “are generally ripe the
moment the challenged regulation or
ordinance is passed.” 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10
(1997); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519, 533–34 (1992).
We clarify that there is no conflict
between these lines of authority and that
Williamson County’s second prong is
applicable to this case.
1
This “seeming inconsistency” in the
law arises because the Supreme Court has
used the word “facial” in two ways. Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d
401, 406 (9th Cir. 1996). First, the Supreme
Court has referred to a type of taking as
“facial”—where “the mere enactment of a
statute constitutes a taking.” Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 494 (1987). Second, the Supreme

The
second
use—“facial
challenge”—describes a type of claim, not a
type of taking. A plaintiff who brings a facial
challenge attacks the “underlying validity” of
a law or regulation that allegedly effectuates
a taking. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 543 (2005). “No amount of
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compensation can authorize” a taking rooted
in a facially invalid law. Id. When a party
challenges the fundamental validity of a law,
the claim turns on an issue that arises
logically and temporally prior to the denial of
compensation. As such, there is no reason to
wait for compensation to be denied; the
constitutional violation would occur at the
moment the invalid statute or regulation
becomes effective.

Cty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168 (second and
third emphases added). The plaintiff’s true
facial challenges to the law—for violating
Substantive Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clause— were not subject to
exhaustion. Id. at 168–69; see Sinclair Oil, 96
F.3d at 406 (noting that the “seeming
inconsistency” should be resolved “by
analyzing the type of facial taking claim at
issue in a particular case”).

This distinction between the facial
takings and facial challenges explains how
our decision in County Concrete is fully
compatible with the Supreme Court’s
statements in San Remo Hotel, Suitum, and
Yee. Those Supreme Court cases each
describe a facial challenge. See, e.g., San
Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–46 (noting that
the plaintiffs “requested relief distinct from
the provision of ‘just compensation’”). The
Court was discussing a now-defunct legal
theory: the claim that “a general zoning law
to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest.” Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). That test
is no longer good law after Lingle, but
modern plaintiffs have other tools at their
disposal to challenge the underlying validity
of a taking. “[I]f a government action is found
to be impermissible—for instance because it
fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or
is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that
is the end of the inquiry. No amount of
compensation can authorize such action.”
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.

To summarize, a plaintiff may be
excused from the first prong of Williamson
County depending on the type of taking
alleged. If the taking occurred through an
exercise of discretion, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the government reached a
final decision. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at
186. But if the taking occurred on the face of
a statute, ordinance, or regulation, that
requirement does not apply. Cty. Concrete,
442 F.3d at 164–65. As for Williamson
County’s second prong, the plaintiff may be
excused from exhausting state-law remedies
depending on the type of claim asserted and
the form of relief appropriate for that claim.
If the plaintiff’s claim is based on a lack of
compensation—i.e., the claim arises under
the Just Compensation Clause—then the
plaintiff must first seek compensation under
state law (provided the state’s procedures are
adequate). Id. at 168. If instead the plaintiff
challenges the underlying validity of the
taking, perhaps for lacking a public purpose
or for violating due process, then the denial
of compensation is irrelevant to the existence
of a ripe claim and Williamson County’s
second prong is inapplicable. Id. at 168–69.

By contrast, the Fifth Amendment
claim in County Concrete for which this
Court required exhaustion was not a facial
challenge. The taking occurred on the face of
an ordinance, but the plaintiff merely sought
compensation. That is why this Court
emphasized that the claim at issue was “a
facial Just Compensation Takings claim.”

2
Despite their being characterized as
facial challenges, Knick’s claims are,
unavoidably, claims for compensation. They
are therefore subject to exhaustion under
Williamson County.
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Knick does not claim that the alleged
taking violates the Public Use Clause.
Furthermore, the District Court dismissed the
due-process claims asserted in Knick’s
original complaint, and Knick does not
appeal that ruling. All that remains is the
allegation that the Township violated the
Fifth Amendment because it took Knick’s
property without compensation. As pled in
the Second Amended Complaint:

has no surviving claim that the taking itself
was invalid, apart from the fact that she has
not received compensation. The remedy for
an uncompensated (but otherwise valid)
taking is compensation.
Knick argues that invalidation of the
Ordinance is still appropriate because the
Ordinance does not provide a self contained
mechanism for compensating property
owners. This argument is misplaced. “[T]he
Fifth Amendment [does not] require that just
compensation be paid in advance of, or
contemporaneously with, the taking; all that
is required is that a reasonable, certain and
adequate
provision
for
obtaining
compensation exist at the time of the taking.”
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (internal
quotation marks omitted). That provision
here is inverse-condemnation proceedings
under Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain
Code.

36. The Ordinance requires private
property owners to allow the general
public to enter, traverse, and occupy
their
private
land,
without
compensation, every day of the year.
As such, on its face, the Ordinance
causes an unconstitutional physical
invasion and taking of private
property.
37. The Ordinance also causes an
unconstitutional physical taking on its
face in authorizing the Township’s
“Code Enforcement Officer and/or
his/her agents and representatives” to
enter, traverse and occupy private
property for the purpose of
determining the “existence” of any
cemetery, without any provision of
compensation to the effected owners.

Accordingly, we conclude that
Knick’s claims arise under the Just
Compensation Clause subject to exhaustion
under Williamson County and must therefore
be exhausted using inverse-condemnation
proceedings.
B
Second, Knick argues that she
exhausted state-law remedies because she
sued unsuccessfully in state court. We
disagree.

...
42. As applied to Plaintiff, the
Ordinance effects an uncompensated
physical taking of her property by
requiring Plaintiff to open her private
property to the public, on pain of civil
fines and penalties

The Eminent Domain Code provides
the “complete and exclusive procedure and
law to govern all condemnations of property
for public purposes and the assessment of
damages.” 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102(a).
Knick did not pursue the “complete and
exclusive
procedure”
to
obtain
compensation, id., and therefore failed to
ripen her claims, see Cowell, 263 F.3d at 291.

App. 263–64 (emphases added).
To be sure, Knick’s Second Amended
Complaint seeks injunctive relief. But Knick
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Knick’s state-court action only
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, not
compensation. As such, Knick could not have
“been denied compensation” as part of that
action. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195; see
Bd. of Supervisors of Shenango Twp. v.
McClimans, 597 A.2d 738, 742 n.5 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (“[A]ny claim for
monetary damages is not properly before this
Court and must be pursued under the
provisions of the Eminent Domain Code.”).
Furthermore, the claims for injunctive relief
presented to the state court (such as Knick’s
due-process challenge) are no longer before
us. Even if they were, they would not be
subject to Williamson County exhaustion.
Cty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168–69.

Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d
533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013), and its companion
case Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 728
F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013). In Sansotta, the
Fourth Circuit overlooked Williamson
County because the defendant removed the
action to federal court, thwarting the
plaintiff’s effort to exhaust. The defendant’s
“manipulation” provided strong equitable
reasons to overlook exhaustion. Sansotta,
724 F.3d at 545; see also Sherman v. Town of
Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2014). In
Toloczko, the property owner was a
defendant in an action brought by the state to
compel the demolition of their property. The
property owners removed the action to
federal court, and only then asserted
counterclaims under the Takings Clause. The
Fourth Circuit noted that, if the owner was
required to go back to state court, they would
have been subjected to “piecemeal litigation”
in two forums at once. 728 F.3d at 399
(quoting San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 346);
see also Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2063–64
(holding that petitioners could raise a takings
defense in an enforcement action).

Accordingly, we conclude that
Knick’s earlier state lawsuit did not
constitute
exhaustion
of
state-law
compensation remedies for purposes of
Williamson County’s second prong.
C
Finally, Knick argues that Williamson
County is a prudential doctrine, and we may
therefore overlook it in appropriate cases. We
decline to do so here.

For another example, the Ninth
Circuit declined to enforce Williamson
County in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638
F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). First, the
Court rejected the claim on the merits, “so it
would be a waste of the parties’ and the
courts’ resources to bounce the case through
more rounds of litigation.” Id. at 1118.
Second, the Court noted that “the law
changed after their trip to state court,” and “it
is hard to see any value in forcing a second
trip on them.” Id.

Knick’s initial premise is correct:
Williamson County’s requirements are
prudential. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133
S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013). But “merely
because exhaustion requirements are
prudential does not mean that they are
without teeth. Even prudential exhaustion
requirements will be excused in only a
narrow set of circumstances.” Wilson v.
MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007)

Knick does not argue that inversecondemnation proceedings would be
unavailable or futile. Instead, she argues that
allowing her claims to proceed would be
more efficient and would avoid piecemeal
litigation. But because Knick’s Just

Several of our sister circuits have
declined to enforce Williamson County’s
requirements based on the equities presented
in individual cases. Knick relies primarily on
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Compensation Clause claims are all that
remain in the case, there is no risk of
piecemeal litigation comparable to Toloczko.
Nor has Knick identified any exceptional
circumstance—such as the Township
thwarting
her
access
to
inversecondemnation proceedings as in Sansotta, or
a change in applicable law after state-court
proceedings concluded as in Guggenheim.
Even if it were more efficient to allow
Knick’s claims to proceed, that would be true
in any case where a litigant asks a court to
waive her failure to meet a prudential
requirement.

access during daylight hours does not change
the fact that land must be accessible every
day, indefinitely. See Ark. Game & Fish
Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519
(2012) (noting that, in United States v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316 (1917), “‘inevitably recurring’”
flooding created a permanent condition on
the land, which “gave rise to a takings claim
no less valid than the claim of an owner
whose land was continuously kept under
water”); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d
1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he concept
of permanent physical occupation does not
require that in every instance the occupation
be
exclusive,
or
continuous
and
uninterrupted.”).

Finally, the Ninth Circuit declined to
enforce Williamson County because it was
more efficient to simply reject the property
owner’s claims on the merits. Guggenheim,
638 F.3d at 1118; see also MHC Fin. Ltd.
P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118,
1130 (9th Cir. 2013). While we do not rule on
the merits here, we note that Knick’s claims
do not suffer from any obvious infirmities
that would tempt us to follow the Ninth
Circuit’s example. Knick relies on a
straightforward application of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, which found it
“obvious” that an easement for public access
across private property constituted a
permanent physical taking. 483 U.S. 825, 831
(1987); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). The fact
that the Ordinance only mandates public

In sum, even prudential requirements
should not be lightly cast aside. We think
there is “value in forcing a second trip” to
state court here. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at
1118. The Commonwealth’s inversecondemnation mechanism is better equipped
to value Knick’s land than the federal courts,
and litigants must be incentivized to pursue
relief through proper channels. Accordingly,
we will affirm the District Court’s order
dismissing the takings claims without
prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law
compensation remedies.
V
For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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“U.S. Supreme Court To Review New Taking Case–Will It Become Easier To File
Takings Claims In Federal Courts?”
Lexology
Brian J. Connolly
March 11, 2018
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a
petition for certiorari in the case of Knick v.
Township of Scott. In Knick, the Court is
being asked to re-examine its 30-year-old
doctrine requiring takings claimants to
exhaust state court remedies before filing a
claim for just compensation stemming from a
regulatory taking in federal court. The
decision to grant the petition indicates that at
least four justices agree that it’s time to
consider eliminating procedural hurdles
created by the Court’s 1985 decision
in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank.

Although Knick attempted to convince the
township that no documentation proved the
existence of such a burial ground, the
township passed an ordinance in 2012
allowing general public access to any private
cemetery during daylight hours. Knick
attempted to block public access to her
property, but was issued a notice of violation
by the township’s code enforcement officer.
Knick first sued in the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas in 2013, claiming that the
township’s ordinance had effectively taken
her property. Because the township had not
yet filed any judicial action against Knick,
the state court dismissed her claim. She then
filed suit in federal court, again seeking
compensation for the alleged taking. The
federal district court dismissed her claims as
being unripe, since Knick had not sought
compensation through state courts. The Third
Circuit affirmed the district court, similarly
finding that Knick’s facial and as-applied
claims were unripe. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari last week.

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution prohibits the government from
taking private property without justly
compensating the property owner. The
Takings Clause has been expanded to allow
owners to seek compensation in cases where
government regulation becomes so onerous
that it effectively takes property.
Knick addresses a township law requiring
individual property owners to, without
compensation, maintain their properties open
for public access. Rose Mary Knick’s 90-acre
parcel in western Pennsylvania, which
includes her personal residence, was
identified by township officials as being the
possible site of an ancient burial ground.

At issue in the case is what is frequently
termed the “state litigation rule.”
Understanding the rule requires a look back
at Williamson County. In that case, which
involved the denial of a plat application by a
county planning commission and subsequent
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regulatory taking claim, the Supreme Court
held that a party bringing a regulatory taking
claim must first exhaust all state judicial
remedies before bringing such a claim in
federal court. The Supreme Court
specifically found in Williamson County that
a plaintiff wishing to seek compensation for
an alleged regulatory taking must first
exhaust all administrative remedies—
in Williamson County, the plaintiff should
have sought a variance—and must also avail
itself of any state procedures for obtaining
compensation. In most cases, that second
requirement would have plaintiffs seeking
compensation through state courts.

Property rights advocates have long panned
the Williamson County decision as imposing
a serious and unnecessarily high burden on
property owners who wish to seek
compensation in the event their property has
allegedly been taken as a result of an onerous
regulation. As Knick notes in her petition for
certiorari, many problems have been
observed with Williamson County. First,
because federal courts are required under the
Constitution to afford full faith and credit to
state court decisions, most state court takings
decisions have been found to be
unreviewable by federal courts. Second,
because many parties remove takings claims
to federal court, and federal courts
subsequently dismiss such claims as unripe,
the removal of these claims makes them
effectively unreviewable.

The
practical
effect
of Williamson
County has been to require plaintiffs seeking
compensation for alleged takings to proceed
through lengthy and costly state court
litigation, all the way to a point of finality,
before even commencing federal litigation to
vindicate their Fifth Amendment rights. In
Colorado, for example, a landowner whose
land use application was denied and who
wanted to bring a subsequent regulatory
taking claim would be required to file an
action under Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 106(a)(4), along with a
regulatory taking claim. The claim would
need to be litigated through district court and
then through the Colorado Court of Appeals.
Only after the Colorado Supreme Court
either ruled in favor of the defendant or
denied a petition for certiorari—which could
be expected to take anywhere from three to
five years after the denial, and impose
significant cost—could the plaintiff then file
a claim in federal district court.

The plaintiff in Knick asks the Supreme
Court to do one of two things. It first asks the
Court
to
reverse
its Williamson
County decision in order to allow takings
claimants to bring their claims in federal
court. In the alternative, Knick asks the Court
to at least recognize that facial takings claims
(i.e. claims that a law effects a taking on its
face) be allowed to proceed to federal court
without a detour through state court.
Assuming the Supreme Court grants either
request, it could be considered a significant
win for property rights advocates.
There is no telling what the Court will do
with Knick. Early indications suggest that
Justices Thomas and Kennedy are not fond of
the state litigation rule, as they joined
together in a dissent from a denial of
certiorari in an earlier case that attempted to
seek the Court’s reversal of Williamson
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County. And given the pro-property rights
position of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Gorsuch, there is a strong initial
indication that Williamson County’s days are
numbered. However, the Court has been

known to surprise, and much remains to be
seen.
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“High court May Clarify Decades-Old Procedural Takings Issue”
Law360
Andrew McIntyre
March 13, 2018
The U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to
hear a case concerning a Pennsylvania
property owner's struggle to get state and
federal courts to hear her claim that the
government has unconstitutionally taken
value from her land, and lawyers say the
decision is likely to clarify a murky
procedural area that for decades has resulted
in delays and additional costs for real estate
projects
across
the
country.

created confusion and delays for real estate
matters, and lawyers say local governments
have even used the Williamson decision to
gain leverage, as a way to slow down certain
projects.
And the high court's decision will also
provide clarity on the particular situation
Knick finds herself in, after a state court
turned her case away on procedural grounds
and a federal court said Knick hadn't fulfilled
the state court requirement under
Williamson.

The high court in Rose Mary Knick v.
Township of Scott, Pennsylvania et al. will
decide whether plaintiff and property owner
Rose Mary Knick can go directly to federal
court with a taking claim. Knick owns a 90acre farm in western Pennsylvania, and
government inspectors want to come onto
Knick's property to search for ancient burial
sites, but she claims such action is an
unconstitutional
taking.

"The state court said, 'We don't need to
decide this. You don't have any claim here.'
The federal court said, 'You don't have any
claim here,'" said Janet Johnson of Schiff
Hardin LLP. "The argument her lawyers are
making is, 'Look, she's being whipsawed
between two courts. She hasn't had her day in
court.'"

But the larger question, lawyers say, is how
the high court will interpret a 33-year-old
Supreme Court decision that says such
disputes can only go to federal court after the
plaintiff
has
unsuccessfully
sought
compensation
in
state
court.

After a Pennsylvania state court turned her
away on procedural grounds, Knick filed a
lawsuit in federal court, and while the Third
Circuit acknowledged that Knick's claims
were serious and concrete, it could not decide
the case, saying Williamson County does not
allow federal courts to decide such takings
matters until individuals have unsuccessfully
sought compensation in state courts.

That 1985 decision, Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, has for decades
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Williamson County in 1985 dealt with a
developer who had planned to develop a
residential and golf course project in
Tennessee but plans got derailed when local
officials changed density allowances for the
project. The developer claimed it had
experienced a taking, and the high court said
the developer needed to first seek relief at the
state
court
level.

Carr

added.

And while attempts have been made over the
years to get the high court to address
Williamson, those attempts in the past have
failed, because the question has always been
tethered to another question or issue.
This case, though, is unique in that sense: The
high court will for the first time be looking at
Williamson as it relates to takings procedural
issues.

"It's a fascinating case. The Williamson
County case has just for the last 30 years
created an absolute mess," said Chris Carr
of Baker Botts LLP. "Many [of the courts]
have been confused in applying the exact
requirements of Williamson County."

"Oftentimes cases that would present these
issues wouldn't be clean. The issue wouldn't
be isolated," Carr said. "There would be other
issues accompanying it. The difference is this
presents a really clean vehicle for
determining this question. There's been a
growing concern in the federal courts that
things have gone too far in terms of
bureaucracy
and
regulation."

Lawyers say municipalities across the
country have used knowledge that certain
takings challenges have to first go through
state court, and then the fact that circuit
courts have been divided on how to interpret
that 1985 decision, as ways to gain leverage.

Institute for Justice, National Association of
Home Builders and Cato Institute have filed
amici curiae briefs in the case, which experts
say is important not only for making the
system less bureaucratic but also for ensuring
that property owners have access to some
court, whether it be state or federal.

Local municipalities know that landowners
face long, expensive and unknown processes
when it comes to challenging takings claims,
thanks to Williamson County, according to
experts.
"Local governments have [leverage] if they
can delay. They have been playing games that
the lower courts' interpretation, application of
Williamson County, has allowed. To delay,
using claims of unlawful land-use," Carr said.

"For land-use, it's a hugely important case,"
said Bryan Wenter of Miller Starr Regalia.
"There's a procedural whipsaw. ... You never
get
your
opportunity
in
court."

"Local governments gaming the system has
proliferated under Williamson. The costs of
delay, legal costs, get passed on to the
homeowner. This case would clean that up,"

The case could be remanded back to the Third
Circuit, if the U.S. Supreme Court decides
the plaintiff didn't have to go through state
court in order to get to federal court.
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"This decision will decide the split so to
speak between the circuit [courts] that are out
there," Johnson said. "Some of the circuits
have said we're going to interpret this
Williamson case narrowly, and don't have to
go
through
proceedings."

agency regulation, whether federal, state, or
local land-use, can be just a thicket, and that
the regulators can use the confusion and
process to make it so that it's economically
irrational for applicants, developers, to assert
their
legal
rights,"
Carr
said.

And the conservative nature of the court
could mean a favorable decision for the
landowner
in
this
case.

"This is the court's effort to sort it out," Carr
added.
Rose Mary Knick is represented by J. David
Breemer and Deborah J. La Fetra of Pacific
Legal
Foundation.

Wenter noted that Chief Justice William
Renquist before dying in 2005 had said that
he regretted voting yes in Williamson, and
said if he were to do it over again, he'd vote
the
other
way.

The Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, is
represented by Teresa Sachs of Marshall
Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin PC.

"Now you have the case going up with at least
five members on the far right. It's hard not to
be optimistic that Williamson County will be
short-lived,"
Wenter
said.

Institute for Justice is represented by Michael
Berger of Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP,
while National Association of Home Builders
is represented in-house by Devala Anant
Janardan and Cato Institute is also
represented in-house by Ilya Shapiro.

The Williamson decision, in short, has
created as a an "administrative regulatory
thicket" that has existed for 30 years, and the
high court could iron out myriad wrinkles in
the system with its decision in Knick v. Scott,
Carr
said.

The case is Rose Mary Knick v. Township of
Scott, Pennsylvania et al., case number 17647, in the U.S. Supreme Court.

"There's a growing awareness on the part of
the court over the last several years that
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“Supreme Court Will Hear Important Property Rights Case: This could result in a
ruling overturning a terrible 1985 decision that makes it very difficult to bring
takings cases in federal court”
Reason
Ilya Somin

March 5, 2018
Earlier today, the Supreme Court decided to
review Knick v. Township of Scott, an
important property rights case. The most
important issue the Court will consider is
whether to overrule Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, a 1985 decision that makes it very
difficult or impossible to bring takings cases
in federal court. Under Williamson County, a
property owner who contends that the
government has taken his property and
therefores owes "just compensation" under
the Fifth Amendment, cannot file a case in
federal court until he or she has first gotten a
"final decision" from the appropriate state or
local regulatory agency and has "exhausted"
all possible remedies in state court. Even
after all of that, it is often impossible to bring
a federal claim, because a variety of
procedural barriers preclude federal courts
from reviewing state court decisions in cases
where the case was initially brought in state
court. In some cases, governments defending
against takings claims even exercise their
right to "remove" the case to federal court,
and then manage to get the case dismissed
because the property owner did not manage
to first "exhaust" state court remedies (a

failure caused by the defendants' own
decision to get the case removed).
Williamson County creates an egregious
Catch-22 trap for property owners: before
they can bring a claim in federal court, they
must first go through state courts and
administrative agencies. But the very act of
going to state court makes it virtually
impossible to later appeal the case to a federal
court! This is the kind of Kafkaesque idiocy
that gives the legal profession a bad name.
One might ask why it matters whether takings
cases are litigated in state court or federal
court. After all, both state and federal judges
have to apply the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and both have to follow
relevant federal court precedents. In many
cases, the result will be the same, regardless
of venue. But in some situations, particularly
ones where precedent is unclear and the
issues may be ambiguous, state courts could
well be biased against property owners,
because they have close connections with the
state and local governments that undermined
the property rights in question. This may be
particularly likely in the many states where
judges are elected, and are therefore part of
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the same political coalition as local and state
government officials.

determined
tribunals.

In addition, allowing review in federal court
helps ensure enforcement of at least a
minimal uniform floor of constitutional rights
through the nation. That, after all, is one of
the main purposes of having federal
constitutional rights in the first place. As
prominent nineteenth century Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story explained in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, a famous 1816 decision, one
of the main reasons why federal courts have
ultimate
jurisdiction
over
federal
constitutional issues is "the importance, and
even necessity of uniformity of decisions
throughout the whole United States, upon all
subjects within the purview of the
constitution." Story also warned that the
availability of federal judicial review is
essential to prevent enforcement of
constitutional rights from being impeded by
state court bias in favor of their own state
governments:

before

the

national

The
Catch-22
problem Williamson
County creates for takings claimants has no
parallel with respect to other constitutional
rights. Citizens who believe state or local
governments have violated their rights to free
speech, freedom of religion, or freedom from
race and sex discrimination, are not required
to first "exhaust" state court remedies before
bringing a case in federal court.
The supposed justification for Williamson
County is that the state or local government
has not really "taken" property until the
action in question has been validated by state
administrative agencies and state courts. But,
by the same reasoning, one can argue that a
state has not really censored speech or
suppressed religion until state agencies and
state courts uphold the policy in question. If
a state or local government has taken
property without paying compensation, that
is a violation of the Takings Clause,
regardless of whether other state officials
might later decide to reverse that action.

The Constitution has presumed... that
State attachments, State prejudices,
State jealousies, and State interests
might sometimes obstruct or control,
or be supposed to obstruct or control,
the regular administration of justice.
Hence, in controversies between
States, between citizens of different
States, between citizens claiming
grants under different States, between
a State and its citizens, or foreigners,
and between citizens and foreigners,
it enables the parties, under the
authority of Congress, to have the
controversies heard, tried, and

In the 2005 case of San Remo Hotel v. City
and County of San Francisco, then-Chief
Justice
William
Rehnquist
wrote a
concurring opinion, joined by three other
justices (including Clarence Thomas, Sandra
Day O'Connor, and current Supreme Court
swing-voter Anthony Kennedy), in which he
admitted he had been wrong to vote with the
majority in Williamson County, and urged the
Court to reconsider it in a future case:
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As
the
Court
recognizes,... Williamson County all
but guarantees that claimants will be
unable to utilize the federal courts to
enforce the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation guarantee. The basic
principle that state courts are
competent to enforce federal rights
and to adjudicate federal takings
claims is sound,... and would apply to
any number of federal claims.... But
that principle does not explain why
federal takings claims in particular
should be singled out to be confined
to state court, in the absence of any
asserted justification or congressional
directive.

experience than federal courts do in resolving
complex, factual, technical, and legal
questions relating to zoning and land-use
regulations." But, of course, the same thing
can be said of many other types of
constitutional claims against state and local
governments, where state judges are likely to
know more about the relevant "factual" and
"technical" issues than federal courts do.
As
Rehnquist
belatedly
recognized, Williamson County creates a
double standard under which Takings Clause
claims are denied access to federal court in
situations where other constitutional rights
claims would be allowed. This doctrine is a
manifestation of the longstanding second
class status of constitutional property rights,
which the Supreme Court has gradually
begun to reverse in recent years. Hopefully,
the justices will take another step in the right
direction by eliminating an indefensible
anomaly in its constitutional jurisprudence.

I joined the opinion of the Court
in Williamson County. But further
reflection and experience lead me to
think that the justifications for its
state-litigation
requirement
are
suspect, while its impact on takings
plaintiffs is dramatic.

For the factual background to the Knick case,
see this site created by the Pacific Legal
Foundation, the public interest law firm
representing the property owners in the case.

The San Remo majority suggested that
takings cases can be left to state courts
because "state courts . . . have more
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“Woman asks U.S. Supreme Court to hear Scott Twp. Cemetery dispute”

The Times Tribune
Terrie Morgan-Besecker

November 14, 2017
A Scott Twp. woman is asking the U.S.
Supreme Court to hear her challenge of a
cemetery ordinance that would force her to
allow public access to her property.

property to search for the grave sites. A
federal judge dismissed the case, finding the
property is an open field, which is not
protected under the Fourth Amendment. The
3rd Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that
decision in July.

The cemetery is believed to have the graves
of a Revolutionary War hero and several
others.

The Pacific Legal Foundation, a Californiabased nonprofit that fights for landowners’
rights, agreed to represent Knick before the
U.S. Supreme Court at no cost, David
Breemer, a senior attorney for the
organization, said in a press release.

The filing by the Pacific Legal Foundation on
behalf of Rose Mary Knick marks the latest
legal maneuver in a lengthy battle she waged
with the township over a 2012 ordinance that
regulates cemeteries.

“Scott Twp.’s graveyard law forces property
owners to allow warrantless searches by
government and unbridled trespassing by the
public,” Breemer said in the release.

The case centers on a dispute between Knick
and Robert Vail of Scott Twp., who claims
several of his relatives are buried on a section
of Knick’s 90-acre property on Country Club
Road. Knick disputes that there are any grave
sites on the property and refuses to allow Vail
access.

Breemer recently filed a motion asking the
high court to hear Knick’s appeal of the 3rd
Circuit Court ruling. The court accepts only a
fraction of the thousands of cases referred to
it each year. It is not known yet if it will take
the case.

Knick filed suit in federal court in 2014,
alleging a township official violated her
Fourth Amendment right to be free from
illegal search and seizure when he entered her
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“Woman Told Her 90 Acres Now Public After Anonymous Claim of Grave”

WND
Bob Unruh

November 2, 2017
“Scott Township’s graveyard law forces
property owners to allow warrantless
searches by government and unbridled
trespassing by the public,” said Pacific Legal
Foundation Senior Attorney J. David
Breemer. “The Supreme Court should take
Ms. Knick’s case to make sure the township
does not get away with its flagrant
abridgement of constitutionally protected
rights.”

A Pennsylvania woman fighting her local
government’s decision to open her private
property to the public is demanding to know
where in the U.S. Constitution one can
find “warrantless searches” and “unbridled
trespassing.”
The case is being presented to the U.S.
Supreme Court, since state courts have
insisted precedent doesn’t allow them to rule,
and federal courts say they won’t take action
until the state courts do something.

Her land is used for grazing for cattle, horses
and other animals. It’s bounded by fences,
stone walls and “No Trespassing” signs.

The suit was filed by Rose Mary Knick, who
lives alone on about 90 acres of Pennsylvania
land that has been in her family for nearly
half a century.

“There is no cemetery mentioned in the chain
of title going back hundreds of years,” said
Pacific Legal Foundation, which has won
numerous property rights cases at the
Supreme Court.

Officials in Scott Township abruptly decided
to create a law taking away the private
property rights of landowners if anyone
even suspects there was an old gravesite on
the land.

“Nevertheless, in 2013, a town enforcement
officer entered the property searching for
graveyards. Soon after, Ms. Knick was issued
a notice of violation claiming her property
contained an old burial ground that had not
been kept open to the public. She later
received a second notice of violation.”

No proof was necessary for the law to then
require that the landowner provide daily
public access for anyone to trespass.
Knick is asking the high court to overturn the
law as a violation of her constitutionally
protected property rights.

Knick said: “It was unbelievable that the
town would trample all over my rights this
way, making it open season for trespassing
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on my land. I am very hopeful that the
Supreme Court will take a stand for the
Constitution, and for everybody’s property
rights, by striking down this outrageous law.”

When Knick then went to federal court, the
judge there claimed an adjudication in state
court was required first.
“What a mess,” the petition to the high court
said. “The Constitution requires a
‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision
for obtaining compensation.’ But this is
exactly what [precedent] prevents. It creates
a chaotic and unworkable system for
adjudicating federal takings claims.”

Isolated grave sites are not uncommon in
parts of the country where there is no ban on
burials on private ground. And, indeed,
sometimes burials date back to before rules
and regulations were in place. So the plains
of Pennsylvania contain small burial plots for
families.

PLF President Steven D. Anderson said his
group “fights for individual liberty, a core
component of which is protection from
unconstitutional government intrusion on
one’s property and privacy.”

However, the records don’t show any such
location on Knick’s land, PLF said.
The township simply adopted procedures for
its “code enforcement” agents to search her
land without permission, and while
trespassing, they claimed to have found stone
evidence of burial plots.

“Defending property rights also means
insisting that landowners who have suffered
constitutional wrongs have direct access to
federal court for redress. Securing these
protections requires determination and
vigilance, and we look forward to vindicating
these vital principles,” he said.

The lower courts then decided the township
had created a “right of way” for the public.
The township issued her citations, but when
the arguments began in state court, suddenly
withdrew them. The state court then said it
couldn’t make a decision until an
enforcement action was pending.

The demand for access to Knick’s land came
after an anonymous “citizen inquiry” claimed
there was a burial ground there.

136

“Supreme Court Poised to Overrule Requirement that Takings Claims be Filed In
State Court”

Lexology
James B. Slaughter and Gus B. Bauman

March 13, 2018
Signaling a possible sea change in takings
law, the United States Supreme Court has
accepted for review the Third Circuit’s
decision in Rose Mary Knick v. Scott
Township, Pennsylvania, 862 F.3d 310 (3d
Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 1143827
(March 5, 2018). The Court will reconsider
its 1985 holding in Williamson County v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, that required
property owners to exhaust State court
remedies in order to pursue a federal takings
claim. A Pennsylvania property owner is
asking the Court to overrule Williamson
County’s State litigation ripeness doctrine so
that citizens may bring a takings claim for
just compensation under the U.S.
Constitution directly in federal court.

ripeness rule unique to the Bill of Rights.
Forcing federal takings litigation into State
court has led to great confusion, litigation
gamesmanship by localities, and the wasting
of resources by complainants and courts
alike.
In Williamson County, a development
company had sued in federal district court
when a Tennessee county halted an on-going
residential subdivision. The federal court in a
jury trial found violations of due process and
a taking of property under the U.S.
Constitution, awarding damages and just
compensation for the taking. The Sixth
Circuit appeals court affirmed. But the
Supreme Court reversed, announcing a new
procedural doctrine: takings cases against
localities and States are to be filed in the State
courts under State takings laws. Williamson
County, 473 U.S. at 194-97.

The Court seems prepared to do exactly that,
which would remove a tremendous
procedural and practical barrier to pursuit of
takings claims against local and State
governments that impose unreasonable
conditions and exactions on land use projects.
Land owners, developers, and facility owners
will need to follow this case closely and make
sure their perspectives on this vital issue are
heard by the Supreme Court.

Four justices questioned this holding twenty
years later, in San Remo Hotel v. San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), which held
that takings plaintiffs were precluded from
re-litigating claims in federal court under
issue preclusion doctrine. A four-Justice
concurring opinion went out of its way to
question Williamson County’s ripeness rule,
writing that “part of our decision

For decades the Court has come under
criticism for creating in Williamson County a
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including violation of the Fifth Amendment’s
takings clause. She sought just compensation
and equitable relief. The federal court in 2016
dismissed an amended complaint, holding the
takings claim was unripe under Williamson
County, and that Ms. Knick had to file a new
inverse condemnation case in State court and
seek just compensation under State law. The
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ripeness ruling in July 2017. Knick v. Scott
Township, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.).

in Williamson County . . . may have been
mistaken.” San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348.
Now comes Rose Mary Knick. She owns a
90-acre parcel of land in Scott Township,
Pennsylvania. Ms. Knick lives in a house on
the parcel, which also includes farmland and
grazing areas. In 2008, responding to a
citizen’s inquiry about a possible ancient
burial ground on the Knick land, township
officials asked her about it. She replied she
was unaware of a burial ground on her land.
She also said there was no official State
documentation of a cemetery.

Ms. Knick’s petition to the Supreme Court
stresses that “[t]he most well-known problem
associated with Williamson County arises
from the tension between the state court
litigation ripeness rule and the Full Faith and
Credit statute . . . [that] bars federal courts
from hearing a case after a related state court
suit. . . . Accordingly, when a plaintiff
unsuccessfully litigates for compensation in
state court to comply with Williamson, any
[federal] takings claim ripened by this
process is impermissible in federal court
because of preclusion barriers.”[1]

The township proceeded to enact a private
cemeteries ordinance. It required that the
public be allowed to enter private property to
visit a burial ground during daylight hours.
Knick’s land was posted with “No
Trespassing” signs.
In 2013, a township enforcement officer
entered Knick’s property without her
consent, identified multiple grave markers
and tombstones, and the next day issued a
Notice of Violation (NOV) stating that Knick
must allow the public to visit the grave sites.
Knick sued Scott Township in State court,
claiming State constitutional violations,
including that the ordinance’s public access
requirement effected a physical taking of her
property. She sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, but not just compensation.
The State court declined to rule on the case
until the township filed a civil enforcement
action against her. The State case appears to
be still pending.

The petition then highlights the other
significant takings Catch-22 known well by
practitioners -- namely, that the State court
route “is often illusory due to…the principle
that a government defendant may remove
certain cases from state court to federal
court.” That includes takings cases. Such
“[r]emoval prevents state court litigation, and
renders the removed claim unripe in the new
federal forum under Williamson County.”
A third major point raised in the petition is a
practical one: “In almost all takings cases, the
state court is not the government body taking
property, nor does it bear compensatory

Ms. Knick then brought suit in federal court,
claiming numerous constitutional violations,
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liability for a taking. These qualities fall on
the shoulders of the executive or legislative
agency responsible for invading private
property….Requiring state court litigation in
such a case adds nothing to the factual or
legal sufficiency of a takings claim.” In other
words, a state court forum adds nothing to the
adjudication of the federal claim. The
elements of proving a takings claim under the
U.S. Constitution remain the same whether in
state or federal court.

Amici briefs in support of Petitioner are due
within seven days of that filing. Oral
argument will likely occur in the fall of 2018
or early 2019. Average time for a Supreme
Court opinion after argument is three months.
It appears there are at least five Justices ready
to overrule the Williamson County ripeness
doctrine for being the constitutional anomaly
it is. We should know in about a year. Parties
considering filing takings claims should
carefully consider the timing of their lawsuits
to take advantage of the likely reopening of
the federal courts to these claims.

Petitioner Knick’s opening merits brief to the
Supreme Court is due by May 21, 2018.
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Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service
Ruling Below: Markle Interests v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016)
Overview: The endangered dusky gopher frog can only survive in a habitat that meets specific
criteria. The Fish and Wildlife Service designated over 1500 acres of privately owned forest in
Louisiana as a “critical habitat” for the frog, halting the development of the land at a cost of up to
$34 million. The dusky gopher frog does not live in the designated land, nor has the frog been
spotted in the designated land for over 50 years, since the land doesn’t meet the specific criterion
for the endangered species.
Issue: (1) Whether the Endangered Species Act prohibits designation of private land as unoccupied
critical habitat that is neither habitat nor essential to species conservation; and (2) whether an
agency decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat because of the economic impact of
designation is subject to judicial review.
MARKLE INTERESTS, L.L.C.; P&F LUMBER COMPANY 2000, L.L.C.; PF MONROE
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE; DANIEL M. ASHE, Director of
United States Fish & Wildlife Service, in his official capacity; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR; SALLY JEWELL, in her official capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Interior, Defendants – Appellees
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; GULF RESTORATION NETWORK,
Intervenor Defendants – Appellees
Cons/w 14-31021
WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE; DANIEL M. ASHE, Director of
United States Fish & Wildlife Service, in his official capacity; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR; SALLY JEWELL, in her official capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Interior, Defendants – Appellees
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; GULF RESTORATION NETWORK,
Intervenor Defendants – Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Decided on June 30, 2016
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

When the dusky gopher frog was listed as an
endangered species, there were only about
100 adult frogs known to exist in the wild.
Although, historically, the frog was found in
parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama, today, the frog exists only in
Mississippi. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at
62,993–94; Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 35,132. The primary threat to the frog is
habitat degradation. Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 62,994.

This appeal requires us to consider
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s
inclusion of private land in a critical-habitat
designation under the Endangered Species
Act. Misconceptions exist about how criticalhabitat designations impact private property.
Critical-habitat designations do not transform
private land into wildlife refuges. A
designation does not authorize the
government or the public to access private
lands. Following designation, the Fish and
Wildlife Service cannot force private
landowners to introduce endangered species
onto their land or to make modifications to
their land. In short, a critical-habitat
designation alone does not require private
landowners to participate in the conservation
of an endangered species. In a thorough
opinion, District Judge Martin L. C. Feldman
held that the Fish and Wildlife Service
properly applied the Endangered Species Act
to private land in St. Tammany Parish,
Louisiana. As we discuss below, we
AFFIRM Judge Feldman’s judgment
upholding this critical-habitat designation.

In 2010, under the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
1544, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (“the Service”) published a proposed
rule to designate 1,957 acres in Mississippi as
“critical habitat” for the dusky gopher frog.
In response to concerns raised during the
peer-review process about the sufficiency of
this original proposal, the Service’s final
designation of critical habitat expanded the
area to 6,477 acres in four counties in
Mississippi and one parish in Louisiana. See
Revised Proposal, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,776;
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,118–
19. The designated area in Louisiana (“Unit
1”) consists of 1,544 acres in St. Tammany
Parish. Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at
35,118. Although the dusky gopher frog has
not occupied Unit 1 for decades, the land
contains historic breeding sites and five
closely clustered ephemeral ponds. See
Revised Proposal, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,783;
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,123–
24, 35,133, 35,135. The final critical-habitat
designation was the culmination of two
proposed rules, economic analysis, two
rounds of notice and comment, a scientific
peer-review process including responses
from six experts, and a public hearing. See
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,119.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case is about a frog—the Rana
sevosa—commonly known as the dusky
gopher frog. These frogs spend most of their
lives underground in open- canopied pine
forests. They migrate to isolated, ephemeral
ponds to breed. Final Designation, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 35,129. Ephemeral ponds are only
seasonally flooded, leaving them to dry out
cyclically and making it impossible for
predatory fish to survive. See id. at 35,129,
35,131. After the frogs are finished breeding,
they return to their underground habitats,
followed by their offspring. Id. at 35,129.
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Together,
Plaintiffs–Appellants
Markle Interests, L.L.C., P&F Lumber
Company 2000, L.L.C., PF Monroe
Properties, L.L.C., and Weyerhaeuser
Company (collectively, “the Landowners”)
own all of Unit 1. Weyerhaeuser Company
holds a long-term timber lease on all of the
land that does not expire until 2043. The
Landowners intend to use the land for
residential and commercial development and
timber operations. Through consolidated
suits, all of the Landowners filed actions for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against the Service, its director, the
Department of the Interior, and the Secretary
of the Interior. The Landowners challenged
only the Service’s designation of Unit 1 as
critical habitat, not the designation of land in
Mississippi.

summary judgment). Our review of the
Service’s administration of the ESA is
governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”). See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 171–75 (1997) (holding that a claim
challenging
the
Service’s
alleged
“maladministration of the ESA” is not
reviewable under the citizensuit provisions of
the ESA, but is reviewable under the APA);
see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. When
reviewing agency action under the APA, this
court must “set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B)
contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity; [or] (C) in excess of
statutory
jurisdiction,
authority,
or
limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

The district court allowed the Center
for Biological Diversity and the Gulf
Restoration Network (collectively, “the
Intervenors”) to intervene as defendants in
support of the Service’s final designation. All
parties filed cross- motions for summary
judgment. Although Judge Feldman granted
summary judgment in favor of the
Landowners on the issue of standing, he
granted summary judgment in favor of the
Service on the merits. See Markle Interests,
LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F. Supp.
3d 744, 748, 769 (E.D. La. 2014). The
Landowners timely appealed.

Review under the arbitrary-andcapricious standard is “extremely limited and
highly deferential,” Gulf Restoration
Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227, 243 (5th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted), and “there is a presumption that the
agency’s decision is valid,” La. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n v. F.E.R.C., 761 F.3d 540, 558 (5th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The plaintiff has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of validity. La.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 761 F.3d at 558.
Under the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard,

STANDARD OF REVIEW
we will not vacate an agency’s
decision unless it has relied on factors
which Congress had not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be

We review a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo. Nola Spice
Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783
F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Sabine
River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d
669, 679 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the court
of appeals reviews the administrative record
de novo when the district court reviewed an
agency’s decision by way of a motion for
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longer necessary.” Id. § 1532(3). In other
words, “the objective of the ESA is to enable
[endangered] species not merely to survive,
but to recover from their endangered or
threatened status.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir.
2001); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (“The plain intent of
Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost. This is
reflected not only in the stated policies of the
Act, but in literally every section of the
statute.”). To achieve this objective, the ESA
requires the Service to first identify and list
endangered and threatened species. See 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). Listing a species as
endangered or threatened then triggers the
Service’s statutory duty to designate critical
habitat “to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable.” See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i).
“Critical habitat designation primarily
benefits listed species through the ESA’s
[Section 7] consultation mechanism.” Sierra
Club, 245 F.3d at 439; see 16 U.S.C. § 1536
(describing the Section 7 consultation
process). Under this section, once habitat is
designated as critical, federal agencies are
prohibited from authorizing, funding, or
carrying out any action that is likely to result
in “the destruction or adverse modification”
of that critical habitat without receiving a
special exemption. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 7,
federal agencies must consult with the
Service before taking any action that might
negatively affect critical habitat. Only federal
agencies—not private parties—must engage
in this Section 7 consultation process. See id.;
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). Thus, as Judge
Feldman explained, “absent a federal nexus,
[the Service] cannot compel a private
landowner to make changes to restore his
designated property into optimal habitat.”
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 750.

ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We must be
mindful not to substitute our judgment for the
agency’s. FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009). That said, we
must still ensure that “[the] agency
examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d]
a satisfactory explanation for its action.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “We will
uphold an agency’s action if its reasons and
policy choices satisfy minimum standards of
rationality.” 10 Ring Precision, Inc. v. Jones,
722 F.3d 711, 723 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
The
Landowners
raise
three
challenges to the Service’s designation of
Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher
frog. They argue that the designation (1)
violates the ESA and the APA, (2) exceeds
the Service’s constitutional authority under
the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3, and (3) violates the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42
U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. As we discuss below,
each of their arguments fails.
I. Endangered Species Act
Congress enacted the ESA “to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species . . . depend
may be conserved” and “to provide a
program for the conservation of such
endangered species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
The ESA broadly defines “conservation.” It
includes “the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species . . . to the point at which
the measures provided [by the ESA] are no
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satisfy the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’
requirement of Article III, which is the
‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of
standing, a plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that
he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that the injury
is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the
defendant, and that the injury will likely be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Bennett,
520 U.S. at 162 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
The injury must be concrete and
particularized, as well as actual or imminent.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Crane v.
Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 2015)
(“Although imminence is concededly a
somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be
stretched beyond its purpose, which is to
ensure that the alleged injury is not too
speculative for Article III purposes—that the
injury is certainly impending.”). “The party
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden
of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561.

A. Standing
Before addressing the merits of the
Service’s critical-habitat designation, we first
address whether the Landowners have
standing to challenge the designation. “The
question of standing involves both
constitutional limitations on federal-court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its
exercise.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In particular, to
establish standing under the APA, in addition
to Article III standing, a plaintiff must show
that “the interest sought to be protected by the
[plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.” Id. at 175 (quoting Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). Although the district
court correctly held that the APA provided
the proper vehicle for the Landowners to
challenge the Service’s administration of the
ESA, the district court did not address the
APA’s zone-of-interests test; instead, it held
only that the Landowners have standing
under Article III. On appeal, the Service did
not brief the zone-of-interests issue or
challenge the district court’s conclusion that
the Landowners have Article III standing.

Here, the Landowners assert two
alleged injuries: lost future development and
lost property value. The first—loss of future
development— is too speculative to support
Article III standing. Although “[a]n increased
regulatory burden typically satisfies the
injury in fact requirement,” Contender
Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779
F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 2015), any regulatory
burden on Unit 1 is purely speculative at this
point. As the Service emphasized in the
designation, if future development occurring
on Unit 1 avoids impacting jurisdictional
wetlands, no federal permit would be
required and the ESA’s Section 7
consultation process would not be triggered.
See Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,126
(noting that the range of possible economic
impact to Unit 1 of $0 to $33.9 million
“reflects uncertainty regarding future land
use”); id. at 35,140 (observing that
“considerable uncertainty exists regarding

Even though the Service did not
appeal the district court’s standing
conclusion, we must independently assess the
Landowners’ Article III standing. See Hang
On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248,
1251 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The federal courts are
under an independent obligation to examine
their own jurisdiction, and standing is
perhaps the most important of the
jurisdictional doctrines.” (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted)). “Article
III of the Constitution limits federal courts’
jurisdiction to certain ‘Cases’ and
‘Controversies.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). “To
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The Landowners’ assertion of lost
property value, by contrast, is a concrete and
particularized injury that supports standing.
See Sabine River Auth., 951 F.2d at 674
(recognizing that injury in fact includes
economic injury). The Landowners assert
that their land has already lost value as a
result of the critical-habitat designation.
Indeed, as the Service recognized in its Final
Economic Analysis, given the “stigma”
attached to critical-habitat designations,
“[p]ublic attitudes about the limits or
restrictions that critical habitat may impose
can cause real economic effects to property
owners, regardless of whether such limits are
actually imposed.” As a result, “a property
that is designated as critical habitat may have
a lower market value than an identical
property that is not within the boundaries of
critical habitat due to perceived limitations or
restrictions.” The Service further assumed
that “any reduction in land value due to the
designation of critical habitat will happen
immediately at the time of the designation.”

the likelihood of a Federal nexus for
development activities [in Unit 1]”); see also
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. §
402.14(a). Judge Feldman similarly stressed
this point, explaining that, “if a private
party’s action has no federal nexus (if it is not
authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal
agency), no affirmative obligations are
triggered by the critical habitat designation.”
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 750.
Because the Landowners have not
provided evidence that specific development
projects are likely to be impacted by Section
7 consultation, lost future development is too
speculative to support standing. See Lujan,
504 U.S. at 564 (“Such ‘some day’
intentions—without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any
specification of when the some day will be—
do not support a finding of the ‘actual or
imminent’ injury that our cases require.”);
see also Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147–48
(holding that plaintiffs did not have standing
to challenge the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act in part because they
provided no evidence supporting their
“highly speculative fear” that the government
would imminently target communications to
which plaintiffs were parties); Crane, 783
F.3d at 252 (holding that Mississippi did not
have standing to challenge the federal
government’s deferred-action policy because
its injury was “purely speculative” and
because it failed to “produce evidence of
costs it would incur” because of the policy);
cf. Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v.
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108,
117–18 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that the
burdens of Section 7 consultation supported
standing when the plaintiffs identified
specific, ongoing development projects that
would be delayed because of the consultation
requirement).

Causation and redressability flow
naturally from this injury. If a plaintiff—or,
here, the plaintiffs’ land—is the object of
government action, “there is ordinarily little
question that the action . . . has caused him
injury, and that a judgment preventing . . . the
action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at
561–62. We conclude that the Landowners’
decreased property value is fairly traceable to
the Service’s critical-habitat designation and
that this injury would likely be redressed by
a favorable decision. Thus, the Landowners
have established Article III standing based on
lost property value.
The question nevertheless remains
whether the Landowners satisfy the APA’s
zone-of-interests requirement. See Bennett,
520 U.S. at 175–77. The Service, however,
has not argued—either in the district court or
this court— that the Landowners’ interests
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Dep’t of Agric., 796 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir.
2015) (“[A]dministrative implementation of
a particular statutory provision qualifies for
Chevron deference when it appears [(1)] that
Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and [(2)] that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.” (alterations in
original)).

fall outside the zone of interests that the ESA
is designed to protect. “Unlike constitutional
standing, prudential standing arguments may
be waived.” Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs v.
EPA, 674 F.3d 409, 417–18 (5th Cir. 2012).
Although we have previously considered the
zone-of-interests issue sua sponte, see Nat’l
Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Pine Belt Reg’l
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 389 F.3d 491, 498
(5th Cir. 2004), we decline to do so here.
Because the Service failed to raise this
argument, we hold that the Service has
forfeited a challenge to the Landowners’
standing under the zone-of-interests test. We
thus conclude that the Landowners have
standing to challenge the Service’s criticalhabitat designation.

The Service must designate critical
habitat “on the basis of the best scientific data
available and after taking into consideration
the economic impact, the impact on national
security, and any other relevant impact, of
specifying any particular area as critical
habitat.” Id. § 1533(b)(2). “When examining
this kind of scientific determination, as
opposed to simple findings of fact, a
reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983); Medina Cnty. Envtl. Action Ass’n v.
Surface Transp. Bd., 602 F.3d 687, 699 (5th
Cir. 2010) (“Where an agency’s particular
technical expertise is involved, we are at our
most deferential in reviewing the agency’s
findings.”).

B. Critical- Habitat Designation
The ESA expressly envisions two
types of critical habitat: areas occupied by the
endangered species at the time it is listed as
endangered and areas not occupied by the
species at the time of listing. See 16 U.S.C. §
1532(5)(A)(i)–(ii). To designate an occupied
area as critical habitat, the Service must
demonstrate that the area contains “those
physical or biological features . . . essential to
the conservation of the species.” Id. §
1532(5)(A)(i). To designate unoccupied
areas, the Service must determine that the
designated areas are “essential for the
conservation of the species.” Id. §
1532(5)(A)(ii). As Judge Feldman noted
below, “Congress did not define ‘essential’
but, rather, delegated to the Secretary the
authority to make that determination.”
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 760. Thus,
when the Service promulgates, in a formal
rule, a determination that an unoccupied area
is “essential for the conservation” of an
endangered species, Chevron deference is
appropriate. See id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)); Knapp v. U.S.

In addition, under the regulations in
place at the time of the critical-habitat
designation at issue here, before the Service
could designate unoccupied land as critical
habitat, it first had to make a finding that “a
designation limited to [a species’] present
range would be inadequate to ensure the
conservation of the species.” 50 C.F.R. §
424.12(e) (2012) (emphasis added). Unit 1 is
unoccupied. Thus, under its own regulations,
the Service first had to make an inadequacy
determination. The Service’s first proposed
designation included only land in Mississippi
and did not include Unit 1. See Original
Proposal, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,395–99
(identifying eleven units in Mississippi).
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During the peer-review and comment process
on this original proposal, the expert reviewers
expressed that the designated habitat in the
proposal was inadequate to ensure the
conservation of the frog. The experts
therefore urged the Service to expand the
designation to Louisiana or Alabama, the two
other states in the frog’s historical range. See
Revised Proposal, 76 Fed. Reg. at 59,776;
Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,119,
35,121, 35,123–24.

great importance for breeding, and because
they are very difficult to replicate artificially.
See Final Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at
35,123–24. The Service further explained
that additional breeding populations are
necessary for the frog’s recovery and to
prevent excessive inbreeding. See id. at
35,121, 35,123– 24. Although the Service has
created one artificial ephemeral pond in the
DeSoto National Forest in Mississippi, this
artificial pond took ten years to construct, and
it is still unclear whether it will be successful
as a breeding site. See id. at 35,123. In
contrast, as an expert explained at the public
hearing on the Revised Proposal, it is “much
easier to restore a terrestrial habitat for the
gopher frog than to restore or build breeding
ponds.” See also id. at 35123 (“Isolated,
ephemeral ponds that can be used as the focal
point for establishing these populations are
rare, and this is a limiting factor in dusky
gopher frog recovery.”). As the Service
explained in the Final Designation,
“[a]lthough [DeSoto] is crucial to the
survival of the frog because the majority of
the remaining frogs occur there, recovery of
the species will require populations of dusky
gopher frog distributed across a broader
portion of the species’ historic distribution.”
Id. at 35,125.

The Service adopted this consensus
expert conclusion, finding that designating
the occupied land in Mississippi was “not
sufficient to conserve the species.” Final
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,123. The
Service explained that “[r]ecovery of the
dusky gopher frog will not be possible
without the establishment of additional
breeding populations of the species,” and it
emphasized that it was necessary to designate
critical habitat outside of Mississippi to
protect against potential local events, such as
drought and other environmental disasters.
Id. at 35,124–25. The Service therefore
determined that “[a]dditional areas that were
not known to be occupied at the time of
listing are essential for the conservation of
the species.” Id. at 35,123. In sum, all of the
experts agreed that designating occupied land
alone would not be sufficient to conserve the
dusky gopher frog. Thus, the Service’s
prerequisite inadequacy finding—a finding
that the Landowners did not challenge—was
not arbitrary and capricious

The Service therefore searched for
isolated, ephemeral ponds within the
historical range of the frog in Alabama and
Louisiana. See Final Designation, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 35,124. The area in Alabama where
the frog once lived has since been replaced by
a residential development. See id. The
Service noted that it was unable to find any
breeding sites that the frog might use in the
future in Alabama. See id. In contrast, the
Service explained that Unit 1’s five
ephemeral ponds are “intact and of
remarkable quality.” Id. at 35,133. It noted
that the ponds in Unit 1 “are in close
proximity to each other, which would allow

Having satisfied this preliminary
requirement, the Service was next required to
limit the critical-habitat designation to
unoccupied areas that are “essential for the
conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C. §
1532(5)(A)(ii). The Service focused its
resources on locating additional ephemeral
ponds. It explained that it prioritized
ephemeral ponds because of their rarity and
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movement of adult gopher frogs between
them” and would “provide metapopulation
structure that supports long-term survival and
population resiliency.” Id. “Based on the best
scientific information available to the
Service,” the Service concluded that “the five
ponds in Unit 1 provide breeding habitat that
in its totality is not known to be present
elsewhere within the historic range of the
dusky gopher frog.” Id. at 35,124.

framework of breeding ponds that
supports metapopulation structure
important to the long-term survival of
the dusky gopher frog; and (3)
geographic distance from extant
dusky gopher frog populations, which
likely provides protection from
environmental stochasticity.
Id. As Judge Feldman reasoned below, “[the
Service’s] finding that the unique ponds
located on Unit 1 are essential for the frog’s
recovery is supported by the ESA and by the
record; it therefore must be upheld in law as
a permissible interpretation of the ESA.”
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 761
(applying Chevron deference).

Finally, in addition to ephemeral
ponds, dusky gopher frogs also require
upland forested habitat and connected
corridors that allow them to move between
their breeding and nonbreeding habitats. See
id. at 35,131–32. Looking to the upland
terrestrial habitat surrounding Unit 1’s
ephemeral ponds, the Service relied on
scientific measurements and data to draw a
boundary around Unit 1. The Service used
digital aerial photography to map the ponds
and then to delineate critical-habitat units by
demarcating a buffer zone around the ponds
by a radius of 621 meters (or 2,037 feet). Id.
at 35,134. This value, which was based on
data collected during multiple gopher frog
studies, represented the median farthest
distance that frogs had traveled from
breeding sites (571 meters or 1,873 feet) plus
an extra 50 meters (or 164 feet) “to minimize
the edge effects of the surrounding land use.”
Id. The Service finally used aerial imagery to
connect critical-habitat areas that were within
1,000 meters (or 3,281 feet) of each other “to
create routes for gene flow between breeding
sites and metapopulation structure.” Id.

On appeal, the Landowners do not
dispute the scientific or factual support for
the Service’s determination that Unit 1 is
essential.14 Instead, they argue that the
Service “exceeded its statutory authority”
under the ESA and acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it designated Unit 1 as
critical habitat because Unit 1 is not currently
habitable, nor “currently supporting the
conservation of the species in any way,” nor
reasonably likely to support the conservation
of the species in the “foreseeable future.”
They contend that such land cannot rationally
be called “essential for the conservation of
the species,” because if it can be, then the
Service would have “nearly limitless
authority to burden private lands with a
critical habitat designation.”
As Judge Feldman noted, Congress
has not defined the word “essential” in the
ESA. Hence the Service has the authority to
interpret the term. See Sierra Club, 245 F.3d
at 438 (“Once a species has been listed as
endangered . . . the ESA states that the
Secretary ‘shall’ designate a critical habitat
‘to the maximum extent prudent or
determinable.’ The ESA leaves to the

Altogether, the Service concluded:
Unit 1 is essential to the conservation
of the dusky gopher frog because it
provides: (1) Breeding habitat for the
dusky gopher frog in a landscape
where the rarity of that habitat is a
primary threat to the species; (2) a
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Secretary the task of defining ‘prudent’ and
‘determinable.’” (quoting 16 U.S.C. §
1533(h))). To issue a formal rule designating
critical habitat for the frog, the Service
necessarily had to interpret and apply the
applicable ESA provisions, including the
word “essential.” See Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S.
407, 420 (1992) (“[W]e defer to an
interpretation which was a necessary
presupposition of the [agency]’s decision.”);
cf. S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d
581, 596 & n.13 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that, when the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services are charged with
reviewing and approving state Medicaid
plans to ensure that the plans conform to the
Act, the agency implicitly interprets the Act
when granting approvals). The Service issued
the designation as a formal agency rule after
two rounds of notice and comment. Thus, the
Service’s interpretation of the term
“essential” is entitled to Chevron deference.
See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665
(applying Chevron deference in the context
of the ESA); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44.

save to argue, circularly, that we must “insist[
]” that “‘essential’ must truly mean
essential.”
We consider first their argument that
it is an unreasonable interpretation of the
ESA to describe Unit 1 as essential for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog when
Unit 1 is not currently habitable by the frog.
The statute does not support this argument.
There is no habitability requirement in the
text of the ESA or the implementing
regulations. The statute requires the Service
to designate “essential” areas, without further
defining “essential” to mean “habitable.” See
Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, 790
F.3d 977, 994 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the
designation of unoccupied critical habitat,
even though the area was not habitable by the
endangered species). The Landowners’
proposed extra-textual limit on the
designation
of
unoccupied
land—
habitability—effectively
conflates
the
standard for designating unoccupied land
with the standard for designating occupied
land. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015)
(“Congress generally acts intentionally when
it uses particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another.”). As Judge
Feldman insightfully observed, “[their
position] is . . . contrary to the ESA; [the
Landowners] equate what Congress plainly
differentiates: the ESA defines two distinct
types of critical habitat, occupied and
unoccupied; only occupied habitat must
contain all of the relevant [physical or
biological features].” Markle Interests, 40 F.
Supp. 3d at 761. Thus, the plain text of the
ESA does not require Unit 1 to be habitable.
“[R]ather,” as Judge Feldman elaborated,
“[the Service] is tasked with designating as
critical unoccupied habitat so long as it
determines it is ‘essential for the
conservation of the species’ and ‘only when
a designation limited to its present range

When, as here, “an agency’s decision
qualifies for Chevron deference, we will
accept the agency’s reasonable construction
of an ambiguous statute that the agency is
charged with administering.” Knapp, 796
F.3d at 455. The question presented, then, is
whether the Landowners have demonstrated
that the Service interpreted the ESA
unreasonably when it deemed Unit 1
“essential” for the conservation of the dusky
gopher frog. Although the Landowners
acknowledge that “the Service undoubtedly
has some discretion in interpreting the
statutory language of the ESA,” they contend
that the Service “does not have the authority
to apply the term ‘essential’ in a way that is
contrary to its plain meaning.” The
Landowners do not explain what they think
the “plain meaning” of essential is, however,
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would be inadequate to ensure the
conservation of the species.’” Id. at 762
(quoting 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(e)). Here, the
Service provided scientific data to support its
finding that Unit 1 is essential, and as Judge
Feldman held, “[the Landowners] have not
demonstrated that [the Service’s] findings are
implausible.” Id. Thus, the Landowners have
not shown that the Service employed an
unreasonable interpretation of the ESA when
it found that the currently uninhabitable Unit
1 was essential for the conservation of the
dusky gopher frog and designated the land as
critical habitat.

Neither of these provisions sets a deadline for
achieving this ultimate conservation goal.
See Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 989 (9th
Cir. 2010) (holding that the Service need not
determine “exactly when conservation will
be complete” before making a critical-habitat
designation). And the Landowners do not
explain why it is impossible to make an
essentiality
determination
without
determining when (or whether) the
conservation goal will be achieved. See id.
(“A seller of sporting goods should be able to
identify which rod and reel are essential to
catching a largemouth bass, but is not
expected to predict when the customer will
catch one.”). As Judge Feldman concluded,
“[the Service’s] failure (as yet) to identify
how or when a viable population of dusky
gopher frogs will be achieved, as indifferent
and overreaching by the government as it
appears, does not serve to invalidate its
finding that Unit 1 was part of the minimum
required habitat for the frog’s conservation.”
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 762–63.
We also note that, in contrast to the habitatdesignation provision at issue here, the
ESA’s recovery-plan provisions do require
the Service to estimate when a species will be
conserved.
See
16
U.S.C.
§
1533(f)(1)(B)(iii). Congress’s inclusion of a
conservation-timeline
requirement
for
recovery plans, but omission of it for criticalhabitat designations, further underscores the
weakness of the Landowners’ argument. See
MacLean, 135 S. Ct. at 919.

We consider next the argument that it
is an unreasonable interpretation of the ESA
to describe Unit 1 as essential for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog when
Unit 1 “is not currently supporting the
conservation of the species in any way and
the Service has no reasonable basis to believe
that it will do so at any point in the
foreseeable future.” Like their proposed
habitability requirement, the Landowners’
proposed
temporal
requirement—
considering whether the frog can live on the
land “currently” or in the “foreseeable
future”—also lacks legal support and is
undermined by the ESA’s text. The ESA’s
critical-habitat provisions do not require the
Service to know when a protected species
will be conserved as a result of the
designation. The Service is required to
designate unoccupied areas as critical habitat
if these areas are “essential for the
conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C. §
1532(5)(A)(ii).
The
statute
defines
“conservation” as “the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species . . . to the point at which
the measures provided . . . are no longer
necessary.” Id. § 1532(3); cf. Alaska Oil &
Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 555 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“The Act is concerned with
protecting the future of the species[.]”).

Moreover, we observe that the
Landowners’ proposed temporal requirement
could effectively exclude all private land not
currently occupied by the species from
critical-habitat
designations.
By the
Landowners’ logic, private landowners could
trump the Service’s scientific determination
that unoccupied habitat is essential for the
conservation of a species so long as they
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declare that they are not currently willing to
modify habitat to make it habitable and that
they will not be willing to make
modifications in the foreseeable future. Their
logic would also seem to allow landowners
whose land is immediately habitable to block
a critical-habitat designation merely by
declaring that they will not—now or ever—
permit the reintroduction of the species to
their land. The Landowners’ focus on
private-party cooperation as part of the
definition of “essential” finds no support in
the text of the ESA. Nothing in the ESA
requires that private landowners be willing to
participate in species conservation. Summing
up the Landowners’ arguments on this point,
Judge Feldman observed that the
Landowners “effectively ask the Court to
endorse—contrary to the express terms and
scope of the statute—a private landowner
exemption from unoccupied critical-habitat
designations. This, the Third Branch, is the
wrong audience for addressing this matter of
policy.” Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at
769 n.40. We agree. Thus, the Landowners
have not shown that the Service employed an
unreasonable interpretation of the ESA when
it found that Unit 1 was essential for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog
without first establishing that Unit 1 currently
supports, or in the “foreseeable future” will
support, the conservation of the dusky gopher
frog.

designated, the Service had to find that the
species’s occupied habitat was inadequate
before it could even consider designating
unoccupied habitat as critical. 50 C.F.R. §
424.12(e). In part, this preliminary
determination provided a limit to the term
“essential” as it relates to unoccupied areas.
Unoccupied areas could be essential only if
occupied areas were found to be inadequate
for conserving the species. See Bear Valley
Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at 994 (recognizing
that the inadequacy and essentiality
requirements overlap). Here, the Service
made
that
threshold
inadequacy
determination—a determination that the
Landowners do not challenge.
Next, under the ESA itself, the
Service can designate unoccupied land only
if it is “essential for the conservation of the
species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
“Conservation” is defined as “the use of all
methods and procedures which are necessary
to bring any endangered species . . . to the
point at which the measures provided . . . are
no longer necessary.” Id. § 1532(3)
(emphasis added). In light of this definition,
we find implausible the Landowners’ parade
of horribles in which they suggest that, if the
Service can designate an area like Unit 1 as
critical habitat, it could designate “much of
the land in the United States” as well. They
contend that “[b]ecause any land may
conceivably be turned into suitable habitat
with enough time, effort, and resources, th[e]
[Service’s] interpretation gives the Service
nearly limitless authority to burden private
lands with a critical habitat designation.” But
we find it hard to see how the Service would
be able to satisfactorily explain why
randomly chosen land—whether an empty
field or, as the Landowners suggest, land
covered in “buildings” and “pavement”—
would be any more “necessary” to a given
species’ recovery than any other arbitrarily
chosen empty field or paved lot. Here, the

We next consider the argument that
that the Service has interpreted the word
“essential” unreasonably because its
interpretation fails to place “meaningful
limits” on the Service’s power under the
ESA. Thus, we consider whether, in
designating Unit 1, the Service abided the
meaningful limits that the ESA and the
agency’s implementing regulations set on the
Service’s authority to designate unoccupied
areas as critical habitat. Under the regulations
in effect at the time that Unit 1 was
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Service confirmed through peer review and
two rounds of notice and comment a
scientific consensus as to the presence and
rarity of a critical (and difficult to reproduce)
feature—the ephemeral
ponds—which
justified its finding that Unit 1 was essential
for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog.

to ensure that Unit 1 will assist with the
conservation of the gopher frog. It is true that
the Service could manage Unit 1 by
purchasing the land. See 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a).
But the legal availability of other statutory
conservation mechanisms, some arguably
more intrusive of private property interests,
does not undercut the Service’s separate
statutory duty to designate as critical habitat
unoccupied areas that are essential for the
conservation of the species. See id. §
1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (“The Secretary . . . to the
maximum extent prudent and determinable .
. . shall . . . designate any habitat of [an
endangered] species which is then considered
to be critical habitat . . . .” (emphasis added)).

In addition, the ESA requires the
Service to base its finding of essentiality on
“the best scientific data available.” Id. §
1533(b)(2). This requirement further cabins
the Service’s power to make critical-habitat
designations. Here, the Final Designation
was based on the scientific expertise of the
agency’s biologists and outside gopher frog
specialists. If this scientific support were not
in the record, the designation could not stand.
But that is not the situation here, and the
Landowners do not challenge the consensus
scientific data on which the Service relied.
The Landowners have not shown that the
Service employed an interpretation of the
ESA that is inconsistent with the meaningful
limits that the ESA and the agency’s
implementing regulations set on the Service’s
authority to designate unoccupied areas as
critical habitat.

In sum, the designation of Unit 1 as
critical habitat was not arbitrary and
capricious nor based upon an unreasonable
interpretation of the ESA. The Service
reasonably determined (1) that designating
occupied habitat alone would be inadequate
to ensure the conservation of the dusky
gopher frog and (2) that Unit 1 is essential for
the conservation of the frog. We thus agree
with Judge Feldman: “the law authorizes
such action and . . . the government has acted
within the law.” Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp.
3d at 759–60.

In sum, the Landowners have not
established that the Service interpreted the
ESA
unreasonably—and
was
thus
undeserving of Chevron deference—when it
found that Unit 1 was essential for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog.
Likewise, the Landowners have not shown
that the Service’s essentiality finding failed
to “satisfy minimum standards of
rationality,” 10 Ring Precision, 722 F.3d at
723, which means that they have not shown
that the Service acted arbitrarily or
capriciously, either.

C. Decision Not to Exclude Unit 1
In addition to attacking the Service’s
conclusion that Unit 1 is essential for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog, the
Landowners also challenge the Service’s
conclusion that the economic impacts on Unit
1 are not disproportionate. See Final
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,141. The
Landowners argue that because the benefits
of excluding Unit 1 from the designation
clearly outweigh the benefits of including it
in the designation, the Service’s decision is
arbitrary and capricious. The Landowners
contend that because Unit 1 is not currently

Finally, the Landowners contend that
it is improper to protect Unit 1 with a criticalhabitat designation when there are other ways
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habitable by the dusky gopher frog, the land
provides no biological benefit to the frog.
They emphasize that Unit 1, by contrast,
bears a potential loss of development value of
up to $33.9 million over twenty years.

there are no manageable standards for
reviewing the Service’s decision not to
exercise its discretionary authority to exclude
an area from a critical-habitat designation.
See Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at
989–90. It therefore held that the decision not
to exclude is unreviewable. Id.; see also Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n of Bay Area v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, No. 13-15132, 2015 WL
4080761, at *7–8 (9th Cir. July 7, 2015), aff’g
No. C 11-4118, 2012 WL 6002511 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 30, 2012). Similarly, every district
court that has addressed this issue has also
held that the decision not to exclude is not
subject to judicial review. See Aina Nui Corp.
v. Jewell, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1132 n.4 (D.
Haw. 2014) (“The Court does not review the
Service’s ultimate decision not to exclude . .
. , which is committed to the agency’s
discretion.”); Cape Hatteras Access Pres.
Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 731 F.
Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The plain
reading of the statute fails to provide a
standard by which to judge the Service’s
decision not to exclude an area from critical
habitat.”); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CIV. S-050629, 2006 WL 3190518, at *20 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 2, 2006) (“[T]he court has no
substantive standards by which to review the
[agency’s] decisions not to exclude certain
tracts based on economic or other
considerations, and those decisions are
therefore committed to agency discretion.”)

The ESA mandates that the Service
“tak[e] into consideration the economic
impact . . . of specifying any particular area
as critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
After it takes this impact into consideration,
the Service
may exclude any area from critical
habitat if [it] determines that the
benefits of such exclusion outweigh
the benefits of specifying such area as
part of the critical habitat, unless [it]
determines, based on the best
scientific and commercial data
available, that the failure to designate
such area as critical habitat will result
in the extinction of the species
concerned.
Id. (emphasis added). The Service argues that
once it has fulfilled its statutory obligation to
consider economic impacts, a decision to not
exclude an area is discretionary and thus not
reviewable in court. The Service is correct.
Under the APA, decisions “committed to
agency discretion by law” are not reviewable
in federal court. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). An
action is committed to agency discretion
when there is “no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency’s exercise
of discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 830 (1985). “[I]f no judicially
manageable standards are available for
judging how and when an agency should
exercise its discretion, then it is impossible to
evaluate agency action for ‘abuse of
discretion.’” Id.

We see no reason to chart a new path
on this issue in concluding that we cannot
review the Service’s decision not to exercise
its discretion to exclude Unit 1 from the
critical-habitat
designation.
Section
1533(b)(2) articulates a standard for
reviewing the Service’s decision to exclude
an area. But the statute is silent on a standard
for reviewing the Service’s decision to not
exclude an area. Put another way, the section
establishes a discretionary process by which

The only other circuit court that has
confronted this issue has recognized that
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the Service may exclude areas from
designation, but it does not articulate any
standard governing when the Service must
exclude an area from designation. See Bear
Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d at 989
(“[W]here a statute is written in the
permissive, an agency’s decision not to act is
considered presumptively unreviewable
because courts lack ‘a focus for judicial
review . . . to determine whether the agency
exceeded its statutory powers.’” (quoting
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832)). Thus, even were
we to assume that the Landowners are correct
that the economic benefits of exclusion
outweigh the conservation benefits of
designation, the Service is still not obligated
to exclude Unit 1. That decision is committed
to the agency’s discretion and is not
reviewable.

report by Industrial Economics, Inc. That
analysis estimated the economic impact on
Unit 1, and to further refine that analysis, it
included three impact scenarios. The report
noted that Unit 1 bears a potential loss of
development value ranging from $0 to $33.9
million over twenty years. See Final
Designation, 77 Fed. Reg. at 35,140–41; This
potential loss depends on a number of
contingencies that may or may not arise,
including future development projects, the
nature of federal agency approval that is
required for those projects, and possible
limits that are imposed after any consultation
that accompanies federal agency action. As
has been recently recognized, the statute does
not require a particular methodology for
considering economic impact. See Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n of Bay Area, 2015 WL 4080761,
at *5–6. And here on appeal, the Landowners
do not challenge the methodology that the
Service used when analyzing the economic
impact on Unit 1; instead, the Landowners
challenge
the
Service’s
bottom-line
conclusion not to exclude Unit 1 on the basis
of that economic impact. That conclusion is
not reviewable.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015),
does not compel a contrary conclusion. In
Michigan, the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) had interpreted a provision
of the Clean Air Act to not require the
consideration of costs when deciding whether
to regulate hazardous emissions from power
plants. Id. at 2706. Although the Supreme
Court held that the EPA misinterpreted the
statute, the Court emphasized that it was not
requiring the agency “to conduct a formal
cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage
and disadvantage is assigned a monetary
value.” Id. at 2711. The Court further
explained that “[i]t will be up to the Agency
to decide (as always, within the limits of
reasonable interpretation) how to account for
cost.” Id.

II. Commerce Clause
Having concluded that the Service’s
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat was
not arbitrary and capricious, we must next
consider the Landowners’ alternative
argument that the ESA exceeds Congress’s
powers under the Commerce Clause. The
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power
“[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court
defined three broad categories of federal
legislation that are consistent with this power.
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). This case concerns
the third Lopez category—that is, whether the
federal action “substantially affect[s]

Unlike the provision of the Clean Air
Act at issue in Michigan, the ESA explicitly
mandates “consideration” of “economic
impact.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); see Bennett,
520 U.S. at 172. The Service fulfilled this
requirement by commissioning an economic
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interstate commerce.” Id. at 558–59 (citations
omitted).

that might limit its application to instances
that “have an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 611–12.
The next consideration that should inform the
analysis is legislative history and
congressional findings on the effect that the
subject of the legislation has on interstate
commerce. Id. at 612. Finally, courts should
evaluate whether the link between the
intrastate activity and its effect on interstate
commerce
is
attenuated.
Id.
The
Landowners’ constitutional challenge can be
distilled to the question of whether we can
properly analyze the Unit 1 designation
aggregated with all other critical-habitat
designations nationwide. This question falls
under the first consideration articulated in
Morrison. Because the Landowners concede
that the critical-habitat provision of the ESA
is “within the legitimate powers of
Congress,” we need focus on only the first
consideration if we find that aggregation is
appropriate.

The Landowners concede that,
“properly limited and confined to the
statutory definition,” the critical-habitat
provision of the ESA is a constitutional
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority. They maintain, however, that the
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat for the
dusky gopher frog exceeds the scope of an
otherwise constitutional power. Viewed this
narrowly, the designation of Unit 1 is
intrastate (not interstate) activity. The
Landowners further argue that “[t]here is
simply no rational basis to conclude that the
use of Unit 1 will substantially affect
interstate commerce.” In support of this
narrow framing of the issue, the Landowners
imply that it is inappropriate to aggregate the
effect of designating Unit 1 with the effect of
all other critical-habitat designations
nationwide. Instead, the Landowners argue
that we should analyze the commercial
impact of the Unit 1 designation independent
of all other designations. But as Judge
Feldman explained, “each application of the
ESA is not itself subject to the same tests for
determining whether the underlying statute is
a constitutional exercise of the Commerce
Clause.” Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at
758. We agree with Judge Feldman that “the
[Landowners’] constitutional claim is
foreclosed by binding precedent.” Id.

The first consideration is whether the
regulated intrastate activity is economic or
commercial in nature. Id. at 611. The
question thus arises: what is the regulated
activity that we must analyze? See GDF
Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622,
633 (5th Cir. 2003). In GDF Realty, where
we examined the “take” provision of the
ESA, we emphasized that we had to analyze
the regulation of endangered species takes,
not the commercial motivations of the
plaintiff–developers who were challenging
the statute. Id. at 636. Applying GDF Realty
here, the regulated activity in question is the
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat, not
the Landowners’ long-term development
plans.

The Supreme Court has outlined four
considerations that are relevant when
analyzing whether Congress can regulate
purely intrastate activities under the third
Lopez prong. See United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 609– 12 (2000). First, courts
should consider whether the intrastate
activity “in question has been some sort of
economic endeavor.” Id. at 611. Second,
courts should consider whether there is an
“express jurisdictional element” in the statute

The
designation
economic
“[W]hether
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next issue is whether the
of Unit 1 as critical habitat is
or commercial in nature.
an activity is economic or

commercial is to be given a broad reading in
this context.” Id. at 638. In certain cases, an
intrastate activity may have a direct
relationship to commerce and therefore the
intrastate activity alone may substantially
affect interstate commerce. Alternatively,
“the regulation can reach intrastate
commercial activity that by itself is too trivial
to have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce but which, when aggregated with
similar and related activity, can substantially
affect interstate commerce.” United States v.
Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 599 (5th Cir. 2002).

id. § 1538(a)(1)(E)–(F); GDF Realty, 326
F.3d at 639 (citation omitted). Finally, habitat
protection and management—which often
intersect with commercial development—
underscore the economic nature of the ESA
and its critical-habitat provision. See 16
U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A) (requiring that the
Secretary prioritize implementing recovery
plans for “those species that are, or may be,
in conflict with construction or other
development projects or other forms of
economic activity”); see also id. §
1533(a)(1)(B) (listing the “overutilization [of
a species] for commercial . . . purposes” as
one of the factors endangering or threatening
species).

The designation of Unit 1 alone may
not have a direct relationship to commerce,
but under the aggregation principle, the
designation of Unit 1 survives constitutional
muster. Under this principle, the intrastate
activity can be regulated if it is “an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated.” Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561). Thus, there are two factors we
must consider: (1) whether the provision
mandating the designation of critical habitat
is part of an economic regulatory scheme, and
(2) whether designation is essential to that
scheme.

But it is not sufficient that the ESA is
an economic regulatory scheme. The criticalhabitat provision must also be an essential
component of the ESA. If the process of
designating critical habitat is “an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic
activity,” then whether that process—
designation— “ensnares some purely
intrastate activity is of no moment.” Raich,
545 U.S. at 22. “[T]he de minimis character
of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence.” Id. at 17
(citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). When Congress has regulated a
class of activities, we “have no power to
excise, as trivial, individual instances of the
class.” Id. at 23 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). We conclude that
designating critical habitat is an essential part
of the ESA’s economic regulatory scheme.

We have already concluded that the
ESA is an economic regulatory scheme. See
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639 (“ESA’s
protection of endangered species is economic
in nature.”); id. at 640 (“ESA is an economic
regulatory scheme . . . .”). Congress enacted
the ESA to curb species extinction “as a
consequence of economic growth and
development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation.” 16 U.S.C. §
1531(a)(1). Because the ESA’s drafters
sought to protect the “incalculable” value of
biodiversity, the ESA prohibits interstate and
foreign commerce in endangered species. See

This conclusion is consistent with our
analysis of the ESA’s “take” provision in
GDF Realty. There, we held that “takes” of
an endangered species that lived only in
Texas could be aggregated with takes of other
endangered species nationwide to survive a
Commerce Clause challenge. GDF Realty,
326 F.3d at 640–41. That case concerned the
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Service’s regulation of takes of six
subterranean endangered species (“the Cave
Species”) located solely in two counties in
Texas. Id. at 625. Similar to the Landowners
here, the owners of some of the land under
which these species lived wanted to develop
the land into a commercial and residential
area; they sued the government, claiming that
the take provision of the ESA, as applied to
the Cave Species, exceeded the boundaries of
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 624, 626.
Addressing this claim, we upheld the take
provision. We explained that, in the
aggregate, takes of all endangered species
have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See id. at 638–40. Because of the
“interdependence of [all] species,” we held
that regulating the takes of the Cave Species
was an essential part of the larger regulatory
scheme of the ESA, in that, without this
regulation, the regulatory scheme could be
undercut by piecemeal extinctions. Id. at
639–40. Every other circuit court that has
addressed similar challenges has also upheld
the ESA as a valid exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power. See Gibbs v.
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 214 F.3d 483, 497–98 (4th
Cir. 2000); San Luis & Delta–Mendota
Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1177
(9th Cir. 2011); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 442 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir.
2006) (per curiam), aff’g 360 F. Supp. 2d
1214, 1240 (D. Wyo. 2005); Ala.–Tombigbee
Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250,
1274 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo, LLC v.
Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1049–57 (D.C. Cir.
1997). The Landowners have not identified
any federal court of appeals that has held
otherwise.

habitat. As Congress recognized, one of the
primary factors causing a species to become
endangered is “the present or threatened
destruction, modification, or curtailment of
its habitat or range.” 16 U.S.C. §
1533(a)(1)(A). Because of the link between
species survival and habitat preservation, the
statute imposes a mandatory duty on the
Service to designate critical habitat for
endangered species “to the maximum extent
prudent
and determinable.”
Id. §
1533(a)(3)(A). Indeed, the ESA includes an
express purpose of conserving “the
ecosystems upon which endangered species .
. . depend.” Id. § 1531(b); see also GDF
Realty, 326 F.3d at 640 (“In fact, according
to Congress, the ‘essential purpose’ of the
ESA is ‘to protect the ecosystems upon which
we and other species depend.’” (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 93–412, at 10)). Allowing a
particular critical habitat—one that the
Service has already found to be essential for
the conservation of the species—to escape
designation would undercut the ESA’s
scheme by leading to piecemeal destruction
of critical habitat. We therefore conclude that
the critical-habitat provision is an essential
part of the ESA, without which the ESA’s
regulatory scheme would be undercut. Cf.
Ala.–Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at
1274 (holding that “the ‘comprehensive
scheme’ of species protection contained in
the Endangered Species Act has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce” and that the
process of listing species as endangered or
threatened is “an essential part of that larger
regulation of economic activity” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Given
this
conclusion,
the
designation of Unit 1 may be aggregated with
all other critical-habitat designations. As
Judge Feldman correctly observed, “[w]here
the class of activities is regulated and that
class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power to excise, as trivial,

This caselaw compels the same
conclusion here. For one, we see no basis to
distinguish the ESA’s prohibition on “takes”
from the ESA’s mandate to designate critical

157

individual instances of the class.” Markle
Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (alteration in
original) (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 23)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen
a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no
consequence.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17
(citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). We therefore will not look at the
designation of Unit 1 in isolation, but instead
we consider it aggregated with all other
critical-habitat designations. Judge Feldman
reached the same conclusion, explaining that,
“[a]ggregating the regulation of activities that
adversely modify the frog’s critical
habitat”—including the isolated designation
of Unit 1—“with the regulation of activities
that affect other listed species’ habitat, the
designation of critical habitat by the [Service]
is a constitutionally valid application of a
constitutionally valid Commerce Clause
regulatory scheme.” Markle Interests, 40 F.
Supp. 3d at 759. Because the Landowners
concede that the criticalhabitat provision of
the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority, we can likewise
conclude that the application of the ESA’s
criticalhabitat provision to Unit 1 is a
constitutional exercise of the Commerce
Clause power.

Authority,
we
explained
that
an
environmental impact statement “is not
required for non major action or a major
action which does not have significant impact
on the environment.” 951 F.2d at 677
(citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). This standard necessarily means
that if federal action will not result in any
change to the environment, then the action
does not trigger NEPA’s impact-statement
requirement. See id. at 679 (noting that
federal action “did not effectuate any change
to the environment which would otherwise
trigger the need to prepare an [environmental
impact statement]”); see also Metro. Edison
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460
U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (explaining that no
environmental impact statement is required if
health damage stemming from federal action
“would not be proximately related to a
change in the physical environment”); City of
Dallas, Tex. v. Hall, 562 F.3d 712, 723 (5th
Cir. 2009) (holding that an environmental
impact statement was not required when the
federal action “[did] not effect a change in the
use or character of land or in the physical
environment”).
Judge Feldman correctly held that the
designation of Unit 1 does not trigger
NEPA’s impact-statement requirement
because the designation “does not effect
changes to the physical environment.”
Markle Interests, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 768. The
designation also does not require the
Landowners to take action as a result of the
designation. As Judge Feldman correctly
observed, “the ESA statutory scheme makes
clear that [the Service] has no authority to
force private landowners to maintain or
improve the habitat existing on their land.”
Id. (footnote and citation omitted). We agree
that the Service was not required to complete
an environmental impact statement before
designating Unit 1 as critical habitat for the
dusky gopher frog.

III. National Environmental Policy
Act
Finally, the Landowners contend that
the Service violated NEPA by failing to
prepare an environmental impact statement
before designating Unit 1 as critical habitat.
If proposed federal action will “significantly
affect[ ] the quality of the human
environment,” NEPA requires the relevant
federal agency to provide an environmental
impact statement for the proposed action. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). In Sabine River
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area at issue is not presently “essential for the
conservation of the [endangered] species”
because it plays no part in the conservation of
that species. Its biological and physical
characteristics will not support a dusky
gopher frog population. There is no evidence
of a reasonable probability (or any
probability for that matter) that it will become
“essential” to the conservation of the species
because there is no evidence that the
substantial alterations and maintenance
necessary to transform the area into habitat
suitable for the endangered species will, or
are likely to, occur. Land that is not
“essential” for conservation does not meet
the statutory criteria for “critical habitat.”

Alternatively, this claim is resolved
on the threshold issue of the Landowners’
standing to raise this NEPA claim. A plaintiff
bringing a claim under NEPA must not only
have Article III standing to pursue the claim,
but also fall within the zone of interests
sought to be protected under the statute. See
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,
883 (1990); Sabine River Auth., 951 F.2d at
675 (recognizing that the zone-of-interests
test applies to challenges under NEPA).
Other circuit courts have held that “a plaintiff
who asserts purely economic injuries does
not have standing to challenge an agency
action under NEPA.” Nev. Land Action Ass’n
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.
1993) (citing cases from the Fourth, Eighth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits). Consistent with
this conclusion, we have observed in dicta
that a “disappointed contractor” who was
injured by an easement that prevented
development opportunities would not have
standing under the zone-of-interests test
because “NEPA was not designed to protect
contractors’ rights: it was designed to protect
the environment.” Sabine River Auth., 951
F.2d at 676. The Landowners’ asserted
injuries here are similarly economic, not
environmental: lost future development and
lost property value. These economic injuries
do not fall within the zone of interests
protected by NEPA, and the Landowners
therefore lack standing to sue to enforce
NEPA’s impact-statement requirement.

The majority opinion interprets the
Endangered Species Act to allow the
Government to impose restrictions on private
land use even though the land: is not occupied
by the endangered species and has not been
for more than fifty years; is not near areas
inhabited by the species; cannot sustain the
species without substantial alterations and
future annual maintenance, neither of which
the Government has the authority to
effectuate, as it concedes; and does not play
any supporting role in the existence of current
habitat for the species. If the Endangered
Species Act permitted the actions taken by
the Government in this case, then vast
portions of the United States could be
designated as “critical habitat” because it is
theoretically possible, even if not probable,
that land could be modified to sustain the
introduction or reintroduction of an
endangered species.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

The majority opinion upholds the
governmental action here on nothing more
than the Government’s hope or speculation
that the landowners and lessors of the 1,544
acres at issue will pay for removal of the
currently existing pine trees used in
commercial timber operations and replace

PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
There is a gap in the reasoning of the
majority opinion that cannot be bridged. The
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them with another tree variety suitable for
dusky gopher frog habitat, and perform other
modifications as well as future annual
maintenance, that might then support the
species if, with the landowners’ cooperation,
it is reintroduced to the area. The language of
the Endangered Species Act does not permit
such an expansive interpretation and
consequent overreach by the Government.

in Louisiana in 1965 in one small pond
located on Unit 1.
The Service specifically found in its
Final Rule that Unit 1 contains only one of
the physical or biological features and habitat
characteristics required to sustain the species’
life-history processes. That characteristic is
the existence of five ephemeral ponds on the
Louisiana
property.
The
Service
acknowledged that the other necessary
characteristics were lacking, finding, among
its other conclusions, that “the surrounding
uplands are poor-quality terrestrial habitat for
dusky gopher frogs.” While the Service was
of the opinion that “[a]lthough the uplands
associated with the ponds do not currently
contain the essential physical or biological
features of critical habitat, we believe them to
be restorable with reasonable effort” to
permit habitation, the Service candidly
recognized in the Final Rule that it could not
undertake any efforts to change the current
features of the land or to move frogs onto the
land without the permission and cooperation
of the owners of the land. It cited no
evidence, and there is none, that “reasonable
efforts” would in fact be made to restore “the
essential physical or biological features of
critical habitat” on Unit 1. The Service cited
only its “hope” that such alterations would be
taken by the landowners.

Undoubtedly, the ephemeral ponds on
the property at issue are somewhat rare. But
it is undisputed that the ponds cannot
themselves sustain a dusky gopher frog
population. It is only with significant
transformation
and
then,
annual
maintenance, each dependent on the assent
and financial contribution of private
landowners, that the area, including the
ponds, might play a role in conservation. The
Endangered Species Act does not permit the
Government to designate an area as “critical
habitat,” and therefore use that designation as
leverage against the landowners, based on
one feature of an area when that one feature
cannot support the existence of the species
and significant alterations to the area as a
whole would be required.
The majority opinion’s holding is
unprecedented and sweeping.
I

In particular, the Service found that
an open-canopied longleaf pine ecosystem is
necessary for the habitat of this species of
frog. Approximately ninety percent of the
property is currently covered with closedcanopy loblolly pine plantations. These trees
would have to be removed or burned and then
replaced with another tree variety to allow the
establishment of the habitat that the Service
has concluded is necessary for the breeding
and sustaining of a dusky gopher frog
population. It is undisputed that the land is
subject to a timber lease until 2043, timber

A Final Rule of the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (the “Service”)
designated 12 units of land encompassing
6,477 acres as “critical habitat”5 for the
dusky gopher frog. Eleven of those units,
totaling 4,933 acres, are in four counties in
Mississippi, and they are not at issue in this
appeal. It is only the owners and lessors of the
twelfth unit, comprised of 1,544 acres in
Louisiana and denominated Unit 1 by the
Service, that have appealed the designation.
The dusky gopher frog species was last seen
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operations are ongoing, and neither the owner
of the property nor the timber lessee is willing
to permit the substantial alterations that the
Service concluded would be necessary to
restore the potentiality of the ponds and
surrounding area as habitat for this species of
frog.

an endangered species].” Accordingly, the
authority of the Service to designate this area
as “critical habitat” is governed by subsection
(ii). The statute requires that Unit 1 must be
“essential for the conservation of the species”
or else it cannot be designated as “critical
habitat.”

II

The word “essential” means more
than desirable. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “essential” as “2. Of the utmost
importance; basic and necessary. 3. Having
real existence, actual.” The Service’s
conclusion that Unit 1 is “essential” for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog
contravenes these definitions. Unit 1 is not
“actual[ly]” playing any part in the
conservation of the endangered frog species.
Nor is land “basic and necessary” for the
conservation of a species when it cannot
support the existence of the endangered
species unless the physical characteristics of
the land are significantly modified. This is
particularly the case when the Government is
powerless to effectuate the desired
transformation unless it takes (condemns) the
property and funds these efforts. There is no
evidence that the modifications and
maintenance necessary to transform Unit 1
into habitat will be undertaken by anyone.

Review of the Service’s decisions
under the Endangered Species Act is
governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). The Service’s designation of the
land at issue as “critical habitat” was “not in
accordance with law” and was “in excess of
statutory . . . authority” within the meaning of
the APA.
The Endangered Species Act defines
“critical habitat” as:
(i) the specific areas within the
geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed in
accordance with the provisions of
section 1533 of this title, on which are
found those physical or biological
features (I) essential to the
conservation of the species and (II)
which
may
require
special
management
considerations
or
protection; and

The Government’s, and the majority
opinion’s, interpretation of “essential” means
that virtually any part of the United States
could be designated as “critical habitat” for
any given endangered species so long as the
property could be modified in a way that
would support introduction and subsequent
conservation of the species on it. This is not
a reasonable construction of § 1532(5)(A)(2).

(ii) specific areas outside the
geographical area occupied by the
species at the time it is listed in
accordance with the provisions of
section 1533 of this title, upon a
determination by the Secretary that
such areas are essential for the
conservation of the species.

We are not presented with a case in
which land, though unoccupied by an
endangered species, provides elements to
neighboring or downstream property that are
essential to the survival of the species in the

The Final Rule reflects that “Unit 1 is
not currently occupied nor was it occupied at
the time the dusky gopher frog was listed [as
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areas that it does occupy. For example, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that certain areas,
though unoccupied, were “essential” to an
endangered species (the Santa Ana sucker, a
small fish) because the designated areas were
“the primary sources of high quality coarse
sediment for the downstream occupied
portions of the Santa Ana River,” and that
“coarse sediment was essential to the sucker
because [it] provided a spawning ground as
well as a feeding ground from which the
sucker obtained algae, insects, and detritus.”
In the present case, Unit 1 does not support,
in any way, the existence of the dusky gopher
frog or its habitat. Our analysis therefore
concerns only whether the property is
“essential for the conservation of the species”
as an area that might be capable of occupation
by the dusky gopher frog if the area were
physically altered.

species. The majority opinion has not cited
any decision from the Supreme Court or a
Court of Appeals which has construed the
Endangered Species Act to allow designation
of land that is unoccupied by the species,
cannot be occupied by the species unless the
land is significantly altered, and does not play
any supporting role in sustaining habitat for
the species.
The meaning of the word “essential”
undoubtedly vests the Service with
significant discretion in determining if an
area is “essential” to the conservation of a
species, but there are limits to a word’s
meaning and hence the Service’s discretion.
The Service’s interpretation of “essential for
the conservation of the species” in the present
case goes beyond the boundaries of what
“essential” can reasonably be interpreted to
mean. As the Supreme Court has explained,
“an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not
entitled to deference when it goes beyond the
meaning that the statute can bear.”

The majority opinion cites the Ninth
Circuit’s decision regarding the Santa Ana
sucker as support for the majority opinion’s
assertion that “[t]here is no habitability
requirement in the text of the ESA or the
implementing regulations. The statute
requires the Service to designate ‘essential’
areas, without further defining ‘essential’ to
mean ‘habitable.’” I agree with that
statement—up to a point. Land can be
“essential” even though uninhabitable if it
provides elements to the species’ habitat that
are essential to sustain it, as was the case
regarding the Santa Ana sucker. The majority
opinion says instead that land can be
designated as “critical habitat” even if it is not
habitable and does not play any role in
sustaining the species. The Ninth Circuit did
not announce such a sweeping interpretation
of the Endangered Species Act. That court
held only that land not occupied by the
species could constitute critical habitat
because of the “essential” role it played in the
survival of species as the primary source of
sediment necessary for the spawning of the

In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 23 U.S.C. § 203(a) required longdistance communications common carriers to
file tariffs with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). The FCC was
authorized under 23 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) to
“‘modify any requirement made by or under
the authority of this section either in
particular instances or by general order
applicable to special circumstances or
conditions.’” In a rulemaking proceeding, the
FCC made rate tariff filings optional for all
non-dominant longdistance carriers.27 In
subsequent proceedings, AT&T challenged
the FCC’s statutory authority to do so, and
the FCC took the position that its authority
was derived from the “modify any
requirement” provision in § 203(b). The
Supreme Court determined that “modify”
“connotes moderate change,” and examined
extensively other provisions of the
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Communications Act. The Supreme Court
concluded that eliminating tariff rate filings
for a segment of the industry was “much too
extensive to be considered a ‘modification.’”
The Court observed, “[w]hat we have here, in
reality, is a fundamental revision of the
statute, changing it from a scheme of rate
regulation in long-distance common-carrier
communications to a scheme of rate
regulation only where effective competition
does not exist. That may be a good idea, but
it was not the idea Congress enacted into law
in 1934.” The same can be said of the
Service’s, and the majority opinion’s,
construction of the Endangered Species Act
in the present case. It may be a good idea to
permit the Service to designate any land as
“critical habitat” if it is theoretically possible
to transform land that is uninhabitable into an
area that could become habitat. But that is not
what Congress did.

The majority opinion says that MCI
Telecommunications Corp. is distinguishable
because in that case, the agency’s
interpretation
of
“modify”
“flatly
contradicted the definition provided by
‘virtually every dictionary [the Court] was
aware of.’” The majority opinion then
observes that one definition of “essential” is
“of the utmost importance; basic and
necessary,” and concludes that this definition
“describes well a close system of ephemeral
ponds, per the scientific consensus that the
Service relied upon.” This highlights the
opinion’s misdirected focus and frames the
question that is at the heart of this case. That
question is whether the Endangered Species
Act permits the Service to designate land as
critical habitat when the land has only one
physical or biological feature that would be
necessary to support a population of the
endangered species but lacks the other
primary physical or biological features that
are also necessary for habitat. It is undisputed
that ephemeral ponds alone cannot support a
dusky gopher frog population. All likewise
agree that Unit 1 lacks the other two primary
constituent elements, which are upland
forested nonbreeding habitat dominated by
longleaf pine maintained by fires, and upland
habitat between breeding and nonbreeding
habitat with specific characteristics including
an open canopy, native herbaceous species,
and subservice structures. Unit 1 is not
“essential [i.e., of the utmost importance;
basic and necessary] for the conservation of
the species” because it cannot serve as habitat
unless the forests in the areas upland from the
ponds are destroyed and the requisite
vegetation (including a new forest) is planted
and maintained. Because there is no
reasonable probability that Unit 1 will be
altered in this way, it is not “essential.”

The District of Columbia Circuit
Court held in Southwestern Bell Corp. v.
FCC that an agency’s interpretation of a
statute is not entitled to deference when that
interpretation “‘goes beyond the meaning
that the statute can bear.’” That court was
fully cognizant of Chevron’s teaching that
“‘if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the
statute.’” In Southwestern Bell, the FCC
contended that because the term “schedules”
was not defined in the Federal
Communications Act, the FCC could permit
carriers to file ranges of rates rather than
specific rates. The District of Columbia
Circuit disagreed, concluding that “[s]ection
203(a) . . . lays out what kind of filing the
statute requires: ‘schedules showing all
charges.’ This language connotes a specific
list of discernable rates; it does not admit the
concept of ranges.”

The Service’s implicit construction of
the meaning of “essential for the
conservation of the species” is not entitled to
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deference because it exceeds the boundaries
of the latitude given to an agency in
construing a statute to which Chevron
deference is applicable. The term “essential”
cannot reasonably be construed to encompass
land that is not in fact “essential for the
conservation of the species.” When the only
possible basis for designating an area as
“critical habitat” is its potential use as actual
habitat, an area cannot be “essential for the
conservation of the species” if it is
uninhabitable by the species and there is no
reasonable probability that it will become
habitable by the species. Even if scientists
agree that an area could be modified to
sustain a species, there must be some basis
for concluding that it is likely that the area
will be so modified. Otherwise, the area
could not and will not be used for
conservation of the species and therefore
cannot be “essential” to the conservation of
the species.

essential. Rather, the pertinent inquiry is
whether the area is essential for conservation.
An area cannot be essential for use as habitat
if it is uninhabitable and there is no
reasonable probability that it could actually
be used for conservation.
The majority opinion fails to discern
the meaningful boundary that the term
“essential” places on the Service in
designating “critical habitat.” The opinion
fails to appreciate the distinction between
land that, because of its physical and
biological features, cannot be used for
conservation without significant alteration
and land that is actually habitable but not
occupied by the species. The majority
opinion posits that “[the Landowners’ logic]
would also seem to allow landowners whose
land is immediately habitable to block a
critical-habitat designation merely by
declaring that they will not—now or ever—
permit the reintroduction of the species to
their land.” The fact that a landowner is
unwilling to permit the reintroduction of a
species does not have a bearing on whether
the physical and biological features of the
land make it suitable as habitat. Land that is
habitable but unoccupied by the species may
be “essential” if the areas that a species
currently occupies are inadequate for its
survival. Even if the landowner asserts that it
will not allow introduction of the species, the
Service may designate the land as “critical
habitat” because it is in fact habitable, and the
consultation and permitting provisions of the
Act may be used to attempt to persuade the
owner to not destroy the features that make
the area habitable and to allow the species to
be reintroduced. However, when land would
have to be significantly modified to either
serve as habitat or to serve as a source of
something necessary to another area that is
habitat (such as the sediment in the Santa Ana
sucker case), then whether there is a
probability that the land will be so modified

With great respect, at other junctures,
the majority opinion misdirects the inquiry as
to the proper meaning of “essential for the
conservation of the species.” The opinion
examines an irrelevant question in arguing
that there is no “temporal requirement” in the
text of the Endangered Species Act. For
example, the opinion states that the Service is
not required “to know when a protected
species will be conserved as a result of a
designation.” Similarly, the majority opinion
observes that the Act does not “set[] a
deadline for achieving this ultimate
conservation goal.” I agree. The Act does not
require the Service to speculate whether or
when an endangered species will no longer
require conservation efforts at the time the
Service designates “critical habitat.” But in
designating an area as “critical habitat,” the
question is not when the species will be
conserved, which is the question that the
majority opinion raises and then dismisses.
Nor is it a question of when the area will be
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empty field as habitat.” Yet, in the next
paragraph, the opinion says that because the
designation in this case “was based on the
scientific expertise of the agency’s biologists
and outside gopher frog specialists,” this
court is required to affirm the “critical
habitat” designation. It is easily conceivable
that “the best scientific data available” would
lead scientists to conclude that an empty field
that is not currently habitable could be altered
to become habitat for an endangered species.

must be part of the equation of whether the
area is “essential.” Unless the land is
modified, it is useless to the species and
therefore cannot be “essential.” Under such
circumstances, the Service cannot designate
land as “critical habitat” unless there is an
objective basis for concluding that
modifications will occur because otherwise,
the land cannot play a role in the species’
survival.
The majority opinion rejects the
logical limits of the word “essential” in
concluding that requiring either actual use for
conservation or a reasonable probability of
use for conservation to satisfy the “essential
for the conservation of the species”
requirement in the statute would be reliant on
the subjective intentions of landowners.
Whether there is a reasonable probability that
land will be modified so that it is suitable as
habitat is an objective inquiry that would
consider many factors. Those factors might
well (and in most instances probably would)
include economic considerations such as the
values of various uses of the land. The
inquiry would be whether a reasonable
landowner would be likely to undertake the
necessary modifications. In some cases, a
landowner might have entered into an
agreement to modify land so that it may be
used as habitat, and in such a case, there
would be nothing “subjective” in concluding
that it is reasonably probable that the land
will actually be used as habitat and therefore
“essential” for the conservation of the
species.

Apparently recognizing that unless
cabined in some way, the majority opinion’s
holding would give the Service unfettered
discretion to designate land as “critical
habitat” so long as scientists agree that
uninhabitable land can be transformed into
habitat, the majority opinion asserts that at
least one “physical or biological feature[] . . .
essential to the conservation of the species”
must be present to permit the Service to
declare land that is uninhabitable by the
species to be “critical habitat.” It must be
emphasized that this is the linchpin to the
majority’s holding. When the only potential
use of an area for conservation is use as
habitat, the Service cannot designate
uninhabitable land as “critical habitat,” the
majority opinion concedes, even if scientists
agree that the land could be altered to become
habitat. But, the opinion says, if, as in the
present case, there is at least one physical or
biological feature essential to the
conservation of
the
species (also
denominated by the Service as a primary
constituent element, as explained in footnote
12 of the majority opinion), the presence of
one, and only one, of three indispensable
physical or biological features required for
habitat is sufficient to allow the Service to
designate uninhabitable land as “critical
habitat.” The opinion says:

The majority opinion’s interpretation
of the Endangered Species Act is illogical,
inconsistent, and depends entirely on adding
words to the Act that are not there. Those
words are “a critical feature.” On one hand,
the majority opinion says that “we find it hard
to see how the Service would be able to
satisfactorily explain” the designation of an

Here, the Service confirmed through
peer review and two rounds of notice
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and comment a scientific consensus
as to the presence and rarity of a
critical (and difficult to reproduce)
feature—the ephemeral ponds—
which justified its finding that Unit 1
was essential for the conservation of
the dusky gopher frog.

assertion that unoccupied land can be
designated even when it has no features
essential to the conservation of the species,
the opinion rejects this proposition. The
majority opinion says (in attempting to
counter the argument that its holding would
permit the Service to designate an empty field
as critical habitat even though not habitable)
that it would be arbitrary and capricious for
the Service to find an empty field “essential”
if there were other similar fields. The opinion
concludes that if land that is uninhabitable
could be modified to become habitat, the
Service could not deem the land “essential” if
there were other parcels of land similar to it
that could also be modified:

This re-writes the Endangered
Species Act. It permits the Service to
designate an area as “critical habitat” if it has
“a critical feature” even though the area is
uninhabitable and does not play a supporting
role to an area that is habitat. Neither the
words “a critical feature” nor such a concept
appear in the Act. The touchstone chosen by
Congress was “essential.” The existence of a
single, even if rare, physical characteristic
does not render an area “essential” when the
area cannot support the species because of the
lack
of
other
necessary
physical
characteristics

We fail to see how the Service would
be able to similarly justify as rational
an essentiality finding as to arbitrarily
chosen land. In contrast, the dissent,
similar to the Landowners, contends
that “[i]t is easily conceivable that
‘the best scientific data available’
would lead scientists to conclude that
an empty field that is not currently
habitable could be altered to become
habitat for an endangered species.”
Even assuming that to be true, it does
not follow that scientists or the
Service would or could then
reasonably call an empty field
essential for the conservation of a
species. If the field in question were
no different than any other empty
field, what would make it essential?
Presumably, if the field could be
modified into suitable habitat, so
could any of the one hundred or one
thousand other similar fields. If the
fields are fungible, it would be
arbitrary for the Service to label any
single one “essential” to the
conservation of a species. It is only by
overlooking this point that the dissent
can maintain that our approval of the

The majority opinion’s reasoning also
suffers from internal inconsistency. The
opinion asserts that, unlike land that is
occupied by the species, there is no
requirement under the Endangered Species
Act that unoccupied land “must contain all of
the relevant [physical or biological features]”
that are “essential to the conservation of the
species” before the Secretary may designate
it as critical habitat. This clearly implies, if
not states, that the Secretary can designate
unoccupied land as critical habitat even if the
land has no primary constituent physical or
biological element (to use the Service’s
vernacular) essential to the conservation of
the species. If land can be “essential for the
conservation of the species” even when it has
no physical or biological features essential to
the conservation of the species, then what,
exactly, is it about the land that permits the
Service to find it “essential”? The majority
opinion does not answer this question.
Instead, a few pages after making the
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Service’s reading of “essential” will
“mean[] that virtually any part of the
United States could be designated as
‘critical habitat’ for any given
endangered species so long as the
property could be modified in a way
that would support introduction and
subsequent conservation of the
species on it.”

what the Service has done in this case. That
interpretation is as follows: land with no
physical or biological features essential to the
conservation of the species that is not
occupied by the species but could be
modified to become habitable can be deemed
“essential” and designated as critical habitat,
but only if there are virtually no other tracts
similar to it, or land that is uninhabitable by
the species but that has at least one physical
or biological feature can be designated as
critical habitat if the land can be modified to
create all the other physical or biological
features necessary to transform it into habitat
for the species. I do not think that the word
“essential” can bear the weight that the
majority opinion places upon it in arriving at
its interpretation of the Act.

I have difficulty with this reasoning.
There is undeniably a textual difference in the
Endangered Species Act between the sections
dealing with an area occupied by the species
and an area unoccupied by that species. If
Congress did in fact intend to authorize the
Service to designate unoccupied land as
“critical habitat” even if it had no “physical
or biological features . . . essential to the
conservation of the species” but could be
modified to become habitat, then it would not
seem to be arbitrary or capricious for the
Service to designate any particular parcel of
land as critical habitat, even if there were
other similar lands. The intent of Congress
would be that land can be designated if the
survival of the species depends on creating
habitat for it. If this were in fact the intent of
Congress, it would not be reasonable to say
that because there is an abundance of land
that could be modified to save the species,
none of it can be designated. But the majority
opinion is unwilling to construe the Act in
such a manner, because, as the opinion
explains, Congress used the word “essential”
as a meaningful limit on the authority of the
Service to designate “critical habitat.” The
opinion reasons, “[i]f the fields [that could be
modified] are fungible, it would be arbitrary
for the Service to label any single one
‘essential’ to the conservation of the species.”
Acknowledging that land lacking any
features necessary for habitat cannot be
“essential” to the conservation of the species,
the opinion finds it necessary to construct a
tortured interpretation of the Act to affirm

The majority opinion strenuously
denies that its holding allows the Service to
“designate any land as critical habitat
whenever it contains a single one of the
‘physical or biological features’ essential to
the conservation of the species at issue.” But
the opinion’s ensuing explanation illustrates
that is precisely the import of its holding: “if
the ponds are essential, then Unit 1, which
contains the ponds, is essential for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog.” The
Service itself found, based on scientific data,
that the ponds are only one of three “primary
constituent elements” that are “essential to
the conservation of the species.” The other
two primary constituent elements are not
present on Unit 1 and would require
substantial modification of Unit 1 to create
them.
The Service’s construction of the
Endangered Species Act is not entitled to any
deference because it goes beyond what the
meaning of “essential” can encompass. The
Service’s construction of the Act is
impermissible, and the Service exceeded its
statutory authority.
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conservation of the species. There is no
evidence that it is probable that Unit 1 will be
physically modified in the manner that the
scientists uniformly agree would be
necessary to sustain a dusky gopher frog
population. The conclusion by the Service
that Unit 1 is “essential for the conservation
of the species” is therefore not supported by
substantial evidence, and the designation of
Unit 1 as “critical habitat” should be vacated
under the APA.

III
The majority opinion quotes a
Supreme Court decision, which says:
“[w]hen examining this kind of scientific
determination, as opposed to simple findings
of fact, a reviewing court must generally be
at its most deferential.” However, the panel’s
majority opinion does not identify any
finding by the Service as being “this kind of
scientific determination.” Instead, the
opinion appears to address the proper
interpretation of “essential for the
conservation of the species,” as applied to the
point of contention in this case, as a question
of law based on the words Congress chose.

The Service recognized in the Final
Rule that under the Endangered Species Act
and regulations implementing it, the Service
is “required to identify the physical or
biological features essential to the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog in
areas occupied at the time of listing, focusing
on the features’ primary constituent
elements.” The Service explained that “[w]e
consider primary constituent elements to be
the elements of physical or biological
features that, when laid out in the appropriate
quantity and spatial arrangement to provide
for a species’ life-history processes, are
essential to the conservation of the species.”
The Service identified three primary
constituent elements, briefly summarized as
ephemeral wetland habitat with an open
canopy (with certain specific characteristics),
upland forested nonbreeding habitat
dominated by longleaf pine maintained by
fires frequent enough to support an open
canopy and abundant herbaceous ground
cover, and upland habitat between breeding
and nonbreeding habitat that is characterized
by an open canopy, abundant native
herbaceous species, and a subsurface
structure that provides shelter for dusky
gopher frogs during seasonal movements.

The fact that scientific evidence was
a part of the proceedings leading to the Final
Rule does not mean that all determinations in
the Final Rule are subject to deference by a
reviewing court. No one disputes that
reputable
scientists
made
valid
determinations in the administrative
proceedings undertaken by the Service.
However, the scientific evidence and
conclusions have no bearing on the issue of
statutory construction about which the parties
in this case disagree: Did Congress intend to
permit the designation of land as “critical
habitat” when the land is not occupied by an
endangered species and would have to be
substantially modified then periodically
maintained in order to be used as habitat, and
when there is no indication that the land will
in fact be modified or maintained in such a
manner?
IV
The phrase “essential for the
conservation of the species” requires more
than a theoretical possibility that an area
designated as “critical habitat” will be
transformed such that its physical
characteristics are essential to the

The other eleven units designated in
the Final Rule had all three constituent
elements. However, the Service found that
Unit 1 has only one of the three primary
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constituent elements detailed in the Final
Rule—the ephemeral ponds. Isolated
wetlands, like the ephemeral ponds that exist
on Unit 1, are necessary to sustain a
population of the species as a breeding
ground. But frogs do not spend most of their
lives breeding in ponds, and the existence of
the ponds will not alone provide the
necessary habitat. “Both forested uplands and
isolated wetlands . . . are needed to provide
space for individual and population growth
and for normal behavior.” The Service found
that dusky gopher frogs “spend most of their
lives underground in forested habitat
consisting of fire-maintained, opencanopied, pine woodlands historically
dominated by longleaf pine.” Unit 1 is
covered with a closed-canopy forest of
loblolly pines.

In fact, the Service itself concluded
that it is entirely speculative as to whether
Unit 1 will be transformed from its current
use for commercial timber operations into
dusky gopher frog habitat by removing the
loblolly pines and replacing them with
longleaf pines, and by the other activities
necessary to create frog habitat. The Service
was required by the Endangered Species Act
to assess the economic impact of designating
critical habitat. The Service recognized that
as to Unit 1, the economic impact depended
on the extent to which it might be developed,
and accordingly, whether section 7
consultation would be required because of a
federal nexus. Section 7 consultation would
provide at least some potential that the
owners of the land would be required to take
measures to create habitat for the dusky
gopher frog in order to obtain federal permits
that would allow development. But the
Service specifically found that “considerable
uncertainty exists regarding the likelihood of
a Federal nexus for development activities”
on Unit 1, and that only the “potential exists
for the Service to recommend conservation
measures if consultation were to occur.” This
does not constitute substantial, or even any,
evidence that Unit 1 is now or will become
suitable habitat for the dusky gopher frog,
which is the only basis on which the Service
has ever posited that Unit 1 is “essential for
the conservation of the species.” (As
discussed above, the Service has never
contended that Unit 1 is essential because of
support that it provides to another area that is
occupied by the frog.)

The Service also identified the
alterations and special management that
would be required within the areas
designated as critical habit, including Unit 1,
to sustain a dusky gopher frog population.
The Service found with regard to Unit 1 that
“[a]lthough the uplands associated with the
ponds do not currently contain the essential
physical or biological features of critical
habitat, we believe them to be restorable with
reasonable effort.” This finding is
insufficient to sustain the conclusion that
Unit 1 is “essential for the conservation of the
species” for at least two reasons. First,
finding that the uplands are “restorable” is
not a finding that the areas will be “restored.”
Unless the uplands are restored, they cannot
be and are not essential for the conservation
of the frog. Second, the Service does not
explain who will expend the “reasonable
effort” necessary to restore the uplands. In
sum, the designation of Unit 1 as critical
habitat is not supported by substantial
evidence because there is no evidence that
Unit 1 will be modified in such a way that it
can serve as habitat for the frog.

The Service described three different
scenarios to assess the potential economic
impact of the Final Rule. In the first scenario,
“no conservation measures are implemented
for the species.” The Service reasoned that
development on Unit 1 might avoid any
federal nexus and therefore no consultation
would be required, and no conservation of the
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species would occur. The Service therefore
expressly recognized that Unit 1 may never
play any role in the “conservation of the
species.”

that is because if the federal government
would not permit the landowners to develop
any part of Unit 1, why would the owners
undertake to modify Unit 1 so that it could be
used as frog habitat? The Government has no
plans to pay for the creation of habitat on Unit
1. Habitat will only be created, and therefore
conservation will only occur, if the owners
decide to modify their property. The only
evidence in the record is that the owners do
not plan to do so and there is no evidence that
the economic or other considerations would
lead a reasonable landowner to create frog
habitat on Unit 1.

In the Service’s second scenario, the
Service assumes that development is sought
by the owners, section 7 consultation occurs
that results in development on 40% of Unit 1,
and the remaining 60% is managed as dusky
gopher frog habitat. (The Service estimates
that the landowners would suffer a loss of
$20.4 million due to the loss of the option to
develop 60% of the area.) This is the only
scenario, in the entirety of the Final Rule, that
explains how, at least theoretically, Unit 1’s
landscape would be altered so that it could be
used as dusky gopher frog habitat. But the
Service made no findings that this scenario
was likely or probable.

Scenario 3 shows, in the starkest of
terms, why the Service’s position that Unit 1
is “essential for the conservation of the
species” is illogical on its face. Even if the
Government does not allow any development
on Unit 1 because of the existence of the
ephemeral ponds, the Government is aware
that Unit 1 cannot be used for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog
because someone or some entity would have
to significantly modify Unit 1 to make it
suitable for frog habitat. Unsuitable habitat is
not essential for the conservation of the
species.

Under Scenario 3, the Service
assumes that the owners desire to develop
Unit 1, section 7 consultation occurs, but no
development is permitted on Unit 1 by the
Government “due to the importance of the
unit in the conservation and recovery of the
species. (The Service estimates that the loss
of the option to develop 100% of Unit 1
would result in a loss of $33.9 million to the
owners.) Significantly, the Service does not
posit that any of Unit 1 would actually be
used as dusky gopher frog habitat under
Scenario 3, in spite of its alleged
“importance” to conservation. Undoubtedly,

*

*

*

I would vacate the Final Rule’s
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat, and I
therefore dissent.
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“ U.S. top court takes up property rights case involving endangered frog”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley

January 22, 2018
“This was a decision that cried out for
review,” said the company’s lawyer, Timothy
Bishop, adding that federal law is “absolutely
clear that critical habitat must first be
habitat.”

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
hear a bid by timber company Weyerhaeuser
Co seeking to limit the federal government’s
power to designate private land as protected
habitat for endangered species in a case
involving a warty amphibian called the dusky
gopher frog.

The Fish and Wildlife Service did not
immediately respond to a request for
comment.

Weyerhaeuser harvests timber on the
Louisiana land in question and is backed in
the case by business groups including the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Weyerhaeuser
challenged a lower court ruling upholding a
2012 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service decision
to include private land where the frog does
not currently live as critical habitat,
potentially putting restrictions on future
development opportunities.

The agency’s critical habitat designation
covered the tract of 1,544 acres (about 625
hectares) of private land in Louisiana as well
as nearly 5,000 acres (about 2,025 hectares)
in Mississippi. The owners of the Louisiana
land filed a legal challenge to the designation,
saying it would infringe on their rights to use
the property as they see fit.

The case pits property rights against federal
conservation measures. The frog, found only
in four locations in southern Mississippi, also
previously inhabited Louisiana and Alabama.

The frog has been listed as endangered under
the federal Endangered Species Act since
2001. Critical habitat is defined as an area
essential to the conservation of a species that
may require special management or
protection.

The U.S. government identified the
Louisiana
land
partly
owned
by
Weyerhaeuser, which is based in Washington
state, as meeting the criteria for the frog’s
habitat under the federal Endangered Species
Act.

The Fish and Wildlife Service described the
frog as darkly colored and moderately sized
with warts covering its back and dusky spots
on its belly.
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The New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
government in 2016. The Supreme Court,
due to hear the case in its next term that starts
in October, did not act on a similar appeal
brought by owners of other parcels of the
Louisiana land.

type of seal that were based on projections of
future loss of habitat attributed to climate
change.
In declining to hear appeals brought by the
state of Alaska and industry groups, the
justices left in place a 2012 decision by the
administration of former President Barack
Obama to protect a bearded seal subspecies
that mainly lives off the coast of Alaska.

In another endangered species case, the
Supreme Court on Monday rejected a
challenge to federal protections for a rare

172

“Ex-DOI Officials Urge Justices to Keep Frog Habitat Ruling”
Law360
Danielle Nichole Smith

July 9, 2018
restoration of all formerly occupied sites.”
The officials also said that the landowners’
contention that they would suffer financial
harm from the decision overlooked the fact
that a critical habitat designation seldomly
burdened private property owners. The
Interior Department would often work with
private
landowners
to
prevent
a
determination that would hinder their
development plans, the officials said.

Former U.S.
Department
of
the
Interior leaders have thrown their support
behind the federal government in a challenge
at the U.S. Supreme Court to the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service’s finding that 1,500
acres of private property in Louisiana were
critical habitat for an endangered frog
species.
The former officials — whose tenures ranged
from Nixon’s administration to Obama’s —
said in their Friday amicus brief that the
Louisiana land didn’t have to be currently
occupied by the dusky gopher frog or
presently able to support the species in order
to be designated as critical habitat. A ruling
to the contrary, which Weyerhaeuser Co. and
other forest landowners argued for in their
challenge to the Fifth Circuit’s affirmation of
the service’s decision, would undermine
conservation efforts, the officials said.

Further, the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
decisions not to exclude lands from a critical
habitat determination were discretionary and
allowing judicial review of those choices
would be “administratively unworkable,” the
officials
said.
“Many
critical
habitat
designations
encompass hundreds of thousands of acres
and include large numbers of individual
parcels, each with a different owner,” the
officials said. “In such circumstances, there is
an almost limitless number of exclusion
possibilities, particularly since the exclusion
of any one area may make essential the
designation
of
other
areas.”

“It is unlikely that Congress would have
intended federal agencies to act with such
disregard for the recovery prospects of
endangered species,” the former officials
said. “Yet, that would be the practical result
of a ruling that land that has been sufficiently
altered that it cannot be occupied cannot be
designated as critical habitat, even though it
offers the best prospects for successful

And the former officials weren’t the only
ones to back the Fish and Wildlife Service on
Friday, as scientists, professors, small
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businesses and others also filed amici briefs
in the case. A group of amphibian scientists
with a focus on gopher frogs chimed in as
well, saying that the area designated as a
critical habitat was essential for conserving
the
dusky
gopher
frog.

conservation agreements and safe harbor
agreements.
“However, in this case, designation was
applied to a tract of land where the species
has not been present for decades and where
the specific habitat conditions it requires do
not exist,” the company said. “We applaud
the court for taking up this case and we’re
hopeful the outcome will ensure a
designation cannot be made to an area
without firm evidence that it supports the
endangered or threatened species in
question.”

The controversy stems from the Fish and
Wildlife Service’s decision to include 1,544
acres in Louisiana, known as Unit 1, in the
nearly 6,500 acres it determined were critical
habitat for the endangered dusky gopher frog.
Weyerhaeuser along with Markle Interests
LLC, P&F Lumber Co. 2000 LLC and PF
Monroe Properties LLC — which
collectively make up the owners of Unit 1 —
appealed the finding to the Fifth
Circuit, which sided with the federal agency
in
June
2016.

The federal government doesn’t comment on
pending litigation. Counsel for the remaining
parties didn’t respond Monday to requests for
comment.

After the full Fifth Circuit voted 8-6 not to
rehear the case, the landowners petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and
the high court agreed to take up the case in
January.

Weyerhaeuser Co. is represented by Richard
C. Stanley of Stanley Reuter Ross Thornton
& Alford LLC, James R. Johnston and
Zachary R. Hiatt of Weyerhaeuser Co., and
Timothy S. Bishop, Chad M. Clamage and
Jed W. Glickstein of Mayer Brown LLP.

The landowners argued in their briefs before
the Supreme Court that the Endangered
Species Act required critical habitats to be
locations where a species currently lived and
was able to reside. The Fish and Wildlife
Service’s critical habitat determination for
the dusky gopher frogs “stretches the
statutory term far beyond its breaking,”
Weyerhaeuser
said
in
its
brief.

Markle Interests and the other property
owners are represented by Damien M. Schiff,
Anthony L. François, Oliver J. Dunford,
Christina M. Martin and Jonathan Wood of
the Pacific Legal Foundation, and Edward B.
Poitevent II of Stone Pigman Walther
Wittman
LLC.
The federal agencies are represented by Noel
J. Francisco, Jeffrey H. Wood, Mary
Hollingsworth, Edwin S. Kneedler, Jeffrey E.
Sandberg, Andrew C. Mergen and J. David
Gunter II of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Weyerhaeuser on Monday told Law360 that
the company supports species conservation
efforts, noting that it participated in 10
habitat conservation plans, candidate
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The former officials are represented by Ann
E. Prezyna and Jessica N. Walder of Lane
Powell
PC.

The case is Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service et al., case number 1771, in the Supreme Court of the United States.
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“5th Circ. Upholds La. Frog Habitat Decision”
Law360
Juan Carlos Rodrigues

July 1, 2016
The Fifth Circuit on Thursday rejected timber
giant Weyerhaeuser Co.’s appeal of the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to
declare 1,600 acres of private property in
Louisiana as a refuge for the endangered
dusky
gopher
frog.

While the landowners said it is an
unreasonable interpretation of the ESA to
describe the habitat as essential for the
conservation of the dusky gopher frog even
though it’s not currently habitable by the
frog, the panel said there is no habitability
requirement in the text of the ESA or the
implementing
regulations.

Weyerhaeuser and other landowners in the
area argued that the FWS overstepped its
authority by designating their land in St.
Tammany Parish, Louisiana, as a “critical
habitat” that could be used to revive the
species, which is teetering on the edge of
extinction with fewer than 100 adult frogs
left. They said the designation would cost
them millions of dollars and that the land isn’t
a suitable habitat for the creatures anyway.
But
the
Fifth
Circuit
disagreed.

“The statute requires the service to designate
‘essential’ areas, without further defining
‘essential’ to mean ‘habitable,’” the panel
said.
After determining the service’s designation
of the landowners’ property as critical habitat
was not arbitrary and capricious, the panel
also rejected their argument that the ESA
exceeds Congress’ powers under the
Commerce
Clause.

To begin with, the appeals panel shot down
the landowners’ claim that the FWS
exceeded its authority under the Endangered
Species Act by designating the area as critical
habitat despite it not being “essential for the
conservation
of
the
species.”

The landowners acknowledged that the
critical-habitat provision of the ESA is a
constitutional exercise of Congress’
Commerce Clause authority, but they said the
designation of their property as critical
habitat for the dusky gopher frog was an
intrastate,
not
interstate,
activity.

“Congress has not defined the word
‘essential’ in the ESA. Hence the service has
the authority to interpret the term,” the panel
said.

The landowners said that instead of
aggregating the effect of designating their
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property with the effect of other criticalhabitat dusky gopher frog designations in
other states like Mississippi, the panel should
analyze the commercial impact of the critical
habitat designation independent of all other
designations.

The case is Markle Interests LLC et al. v.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service et al., case
number 14-31008, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circui

But the panel said the U.S. Supreme
Court already decided that question in United
States v. Morrison, holding that courts should
consider whether the intrastate activity “in
question has been some sort of economic
endeavor.” The panel said that’s the case in
this
matter.
And the panel also rejected the landowners’
contention that the FWS violated the
National Environmental Policy Act by failing
to prepare an environmental impact statement
before designating the property as critical
habitat.
“The designation of [the habitat] does not
trigger
NEPA’s
impact-statement
requirement because the designation ‘does
not effect changes to the physical
environment,’”
the
panel
said.
The other plaintiffs are Markle Interests LLC,
P&F Lumber Co. 2000 LLC, and PF Monroe
Properties
LLC.
The landowners are represented by Richard
C. Stanley of Stanley Reuter Ross Thornton
& Alford LLC and M. Reed Hopper
of Pacific
Legal
Foundation.
The FWS is represented by Luther L. Hajek,
Mary Hollingsworth and David C. Shilton of
the U.S.
Department
of
Justice.
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